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Article
Energy Security:, Security for Whom?
Matthew F. Smitht and Naing Htoott*
In military-ruled Burma, also known as Myanmar, large-scale natural gas
projects have directly and indirectly led to violations of basic human rights
through the complicity of multinational corporate actors. These abuses are
ongoing and there is an unreasonably high risk they will increase as more gas
projects are developed. This paper assesses the past, present, and future human
rights impacts of large-scale natural gas extraction in Burma, and the
implications these impacts have in terms of corporate accountability. The
paper provides background information regarding Burma's government,
economic policy, and the energy sector and considers past and present human
rights abuses connected to the Yadana natural gas project, developed by a
consortium including Chevron, Total, PTTEP, and MOGE. The authors
argue that the companies are complicit in ongoing human rights abuses in
connection to their investment. The paper then describes the threat of future
human rights abuses in connection to the country's largest offshore gas
deposits, concluding that there is a high risk that current human rights abuses
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in the proposed project areas will be exacerbated by the new gas production,
and that there will likely be abuses directly linked to the Shwe pipeline project.
Finally, the authors assess the interests and actors involved in the Southeast
Asia regional energy security dynamic as it relates to Burma's fast growing
oil and gas sector, human rights, and corporate accountability. They argue
that the energy security strategies of China, Thailand, and India-and by
association, the national oil corporations under those governments -relying
on Burmese resources have paid dangerously inadequate attention to the
protection of human rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While the oil and gas industry has performed a remarkable feat in
delivering energy to a large percentage of humankind in a relatively short
period of time, the benefits of such resource production often evade the
least advantaged actors, who bear the brunt of the negative impacts. In
military-ruled Burma, also known as Myanmar,' large-scale natural gas
projects have directly and indirectly led to violations of basic human rights
with the complicity of multinational corporate actors.2 These abuses are
ongoing and there is an unreasonably high risk that they will increase as
more gas projects are developed. This paper assesses the past, present, and
future human rights impacts of large-scale natural gas extraction in Burma,
and the implications these impacts have for corporate accountability.
In Part II, we provide background information regarding Burma's
government, economic policy, and the energy sector that is necessary to
understand the relationship between human rights abuses and energy
development in Burma today. Part III considers past and present human
rights abuses connected to the Yadana natural gas project, developed by
Chevron (USA, formerly Unocal), Total (France), PTT (Thailand), and
MOGE (Burma). We argue that the companies are complicit in ongoing
human rights abuses in connection to their investment. Part IV describes
the threat of future human rights abuses in connection to the country's
largest offshore gas deposits, which are being developed by Daewoo
International (South Korea) and involve ONGC Videsh Ltd. of India, the
Gas Authority of India Ltd (GAIL), the Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS),
and potentially PetroChina. We conclude that there is a high risk that
current human rights abuses in the proposed project areas will be
exacerbated by the new gas production, and that there will likely be abuses
directly linked to the Shwe pipeline project. In Part V, we assess the
interests and actors involved in the Southeast Asia regional energy security
dynamic as it relates to Burma's rapidly growing oil and gas sector, human
rights, and corporate accountability. We argue that the energy security
strategies of China, Thailand, and India-and, by association, the national
oil corporations under those governments-converging on Burma provide
dangerously inadequate attention to the protection of human rights.
International law accords to the state primary responsibility in the
protection of human rights. However, it is also clear that human rights
obligations apply to non-state actors.3 Multinational corporations bear
rights and duties under international law, and have a moral and legal
obligation to respect, protect, and promote human rights. This paper does
not attempt to address the specific human rights obligations of
1. The country was renamed Myanmar in 1990 by the ruling military without consulting
the citizens. While the terms Bama and Myanna are used interchangeably in Burmese, the use
of the term Burma in the English language is generally preferred by the pro-democracy
movement.
2. Unless otherwise indicated, the term "gas" is used in this Article to refer to natural gas
and not gasoline.
3. See ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS (2006).
20081
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multinational corporations, or the ways in which non-state actors can be
held accountable for their actions. However, the basic human rights
obligations of corporations are the point of departure here and are the
framework with which we consider the plight of local actors in Burma and
the natural resource equation of energy security.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Context
Burma is a country of remarkable ethnic and geographic diversity with
an abundance of natural resources, including oil, gas, and timber, and
minerals such as gold, copper, nickel, gems, and jade. Burma is the largest
country in mainland Southeast Asia, with a relatively large western
coastline on the Bay of Bengal (1,190 miles), and bordering Bangladesh,
India, China, Thailand, and Laos. The country is home to approximately
fifty-seven million people who occupy seven divisions and seven states.
The ruling elite and the military largely represent the majority Burman
ethnicity, while seven major ethnic nationalities - Arakan, Chin, Kachin,
Karen, Karenni, Mon, and Shan -together with at least 130 smaller ethnic
tribes4 comprise approximately 40 percent of the population. 5 Burma's
divisions are generally occupied by Burmans, while states are generally
occupied by ethnic nationalities and tribes, although there is considerable
diversity within some areas.6
During Burma's relatively brief period of freedom from 1948 to 1962,
"the concept of a legal opposition was still new and often resisted," 7 and
the political context was marred by sometimes violent efforts to eliminate
the opposition, including the existence of private armies employed by
politicians.8 People at the local level were excluded from welfare planning
and therefore lacked commitment to government-led projects. Ethnic
minorities were largely disenfranchised and in some cases took up arms
against the government for a range of reasons - struggles which continue
today.9
Military rule in Burma began by coup in 1962 when General Ne Win
disbanded Parliament, suspended the Constitution, and began the period
of intransigent and repressive rule that continues today. The State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC) is the state body run by the tatmadaw
(military), and the tatmadaw is the country's main political actor- in some
4. Myan. Ministry of Hotels & Tourism, The 8 Major National Ethnic Races in Myanmar,
http://www.myanmar.gov.mn/ministry/hotel/fact/race.htm (last visited May 11, 2008).
5. Ethnic Nationalities Council (Union of Burma), http://www.encburma.org.
6. The Divisions are Irrawaddy, Bago, Magwe, Mandalay, Sagaing, Tennasserim, and
Rangoon. The States are Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Arakan, and Shan.
7. CHRISTINA FINK, LIVING SILENCE: BURMA UNDER MILITARY RULE 26 (2001).
8. Id.
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ways, the only political actor.'0 The country is ruled by Senior General
Than Shwe.
After 1988, when the military opened fire on pro-democracy protestors,
ultimately killing as many as 3,000 civilians," the tatmadaw grew
dramatically, turning the country into the formidable military state it is
today. Military personnel jumped from 180,000 in 1988 to over 400,000 in
1996, and that increase coincided with a sharp increase in military
expenditures valued in the hundreds of millions of dollars, mostly for
armaments and other hardware, as well as new naval and air force bases.12
While Thailand is the regime's largest trading partner by a large margin,
most of the junta's military support has come from China and India,
countries with an active interest in exploiting Burma's natural resources,
particularly in oil and gas.13
Politically, the country faces several authoritarian obstacles that are
interwoven with the country's extractive industries. On August 15, 2007,
the junta made an unexpected and fateful decision to remove state
subsidies on natural gas, diesel, and fuels. This led to dramatic price
increases. The price of diesel and fuel increased by approximately 100%,
and the price of natural gas -the country's core asset and largest source of
export revenue for the junta, used domestically for cooking and in
automobiles-increased by approximately 500%. This in turn caused an
overnight increase in the price of basic commodities. The price of rice and
other foods nearly doubled, with marked increases in the prices of beef,
fish, milk, eggs, and cooking fuels.14  Bus fares quickly became
unaffordable for the average citizen, and domestic airfares increased by at
least 30%.15 These increases had an immediate and significant economic
impact on the daily survival of people across the entire country, the result
of which was widespread popular protest led by the country's revered
Buddhist monks. It was a historic nationwide uprising, followed by a
forceful crackdown, widespread repression, and an unknown and disputed
number of killings, some of which were captured on video and broadcast
internationally over the internet.' 6 Human Rights Watch believes that the
10. MARY P. CALLAHAN, MAKING ENEMIES: WAR AND STATE BUILDING IN BURMA 2 (2005).
11. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, BURMA (1989), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1989/WR89/Burma.htm.
12. THANT MYINT-U, THE RIVER OF LOST FOOTSTEPS: HISTORIES OF BURMA 330-31 (2006).
See also ANDREW SELTH, BURMA'S ARMED FORCES: POWER WITHOUT GLORY (2002) (discussing
composition and history of Burma's armed forces); Mary P. Callahan, Of Kyay-zu and Kyet-su:
Tthe Military in 2006, in MYANMAR: THE STATE, COMMUNITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 36, 36-53
(Monique Skidmore & Trevor Wilson eds., 2007).
13. This scenario exhibits what Michael Ross has referred to as the "repression effect" of
oil, i.e., when governments build up their internal security forces using natural resource
revenues in order "to ward off democratic pressures .... " Michael Ross, Does Oil Hinder
Democracy? 53 WORLD POLITICS, 325, 356-57 (2001). See also Matthew Smith, Environmental
Militarism: Burma's Extractive Industries, 52 GREENER MGMT. INT'L 47, 48-55 (2007).
14. Altsean Burma, BURMA BULLETIN, Sept. 2007, available at 14, http://www.altsean.org.
15. Id.
16. For comprehensive accounts of the protests and the ensuing military crackdown, see
NAT'L COAL. GOV'T BURMA HUM. RTS. DOCUMENTATION UNIT, BULLETS IN THE ALMS BOWL: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE BRUTAL SPDC SUPPRESSION OF THE SEPTEMBER 2007 SAFFRON REVOLUTION
2008]
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death toll is "much higher" than the ten deaths originally reported by the
regime,17 and this view has been echoed by others, 18 including the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma, Paulo Srgio Pinheiro.
Pinheiro conducted a brief investigation that he claims was hindered by a
lack of cooperation by the Burmese authorities. He found evidence of at
least 30 killings in Rangoon alone, stating in his December 2007 report to
the Human Rights Council that "several reports of killings indicate that the
figure provided by the authorities may greatly underestimate the reality." 19
Abuses connected to this crackdown are ongoing.20
B. Economic Policy from 1962-2008: From Centrally Controlled to
Pseudo-Free Market
Burma's economic policy and climate of investment was formed
through years of ill-advised military economic policymaking and two
noteworthy market reforms. Since 1962, fundamental economic
institutions have been dismantled and macroeconomic policymaking has
been consistently arbitrary. Inflation has resulted from financing state
expenditures by simply printing more currency; rent seeking behavior
(which is defined as states seeking economic rents from foreign parties, in
this case the state seeking rents associated with the extraction of natural
resources) and corruption are endemic, particularly in the natural resource
sectors; the formation of human capital is hurt by a lack of investment in
health and education; and there is very little investment in the agricultural
sector, where most people eke out a living.21
Part and parcel of the human rights abuses that were initiated by Ne
Win's takeover in 1962 were economic reforms, dubbed the "Burmese Way
to Socialism," which lasted from 1962-1988 and were ultimately
unsuccessful. Ne Win's regime was built on reforms that were a
(2008), available at http://burmalibrary.org/docs4/BulletsnTheAlmsBowl.pdf; and Human
Rights Watch, Crackdown: Repression of the 2007 Popular Protests in Burma, 19 HUM. RTS. WATCH
REP. 1 (2007), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/burma1207/burma1207web.pdf.
17. Human Rights Watch, Burma: Crackdown Bloodier Than Government Admits (Dec. 7,
2007), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/12/07/burma7494.htm.
18. See Burma Death Toll Much Higher: Downer, ABC NEWS, Sept. 29, 2007, available at
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/09/29/2046840.htm (quoting Australian
Ambassador to Burma Bob Davis); UK Fears Burma Toll "Far Higher," BBC NEWS, Sept. 28,
2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7018920.stm (quoting British Prime
Minister Gordon Brown).
19. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights
in Myanmar, 1 10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/14 (Dec. 7, 2007), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/6session/A.HRC.6.14.doc.
20. See Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Myanmar: Arrests Increasing Four Months On (Jan.
25, 2008), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/Myanmar-
arrests-increasing-four-months-20080125; see also Amnesty Int'l, Myanmar Protesters
Sentenced, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/myanmar-protesters-
sentenced (last visited May 11, 2008); Hum. Rts. Watch supra note 16, at 15.
21. Sean Turnell, Myanmar's Economy in 2006, in MYANMAR: THE STATE, COMMUNITY AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 108, 109-10 (Monique Skidmore & Trevor Wilson eds., 2007).
[Vol. 11
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"mishmash of selected Marxist, Buddhist, and Nationalist principles ...
hastily cobbled together" that "owed more to decidedly 20th century forms
of political repression than to any uniquely Burmese socialist agenda." 22
Ne Win ruled for twenty-six years. His reforms, the subsequent economic
mismanagement of the elite soldiers running the country, and widespread
human rights abuses led to forty years of economic underperformance,
turning the country into one of the least developed in the world, earning in
1987 the United Nations' distinction of Least Developed Country (LDC).23
In 1988, just three months after the military crushed a nationwide pro-
democracy uprising, the junta transitioned Burma from Ne Win's autarkic
economy to a pseudo-free market economy, passing Law #10/88, which
opened the country to foreign investment "in order to promote all around
development of [the] national economy." 24 Rather than a positive step
toward a free market, this market reform intensified SPDC's control over
the flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) coming into Burma.25
Shareholding capacity and access to business opportunities was and is
prioritized for the Burman military, their families, and close associates. All
foreign investors in Burma must negotiate a joint venture agreement with
the military, either through the military-controlled Union of Myanmar
Economic Holdings (UMEH), or, in the case of oil and gas investments,
through the military-controlled Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise
(MOGE).26
C. The Energy Sector and Extractive Contracts
The military operates the Ministry of Energy, which includes the
Energy Planning Department (EPD), the Myanmar Petrochemicals
Enterprise (MPE), the Myanmar Petroleum Products Enterprise (MPPE),
and MOGE. MOGE is a completely state-owned enterprise responsible for
upstream oil and gas exploration and production. By law, any foreign
investment in Burma's extractive industries requires a 50:50 joint venture
with MOGE, and oil and gas investments in Burma require production
sharing contracts (PSCs). In other developing countries, the advantage of a
PSC as compared with other arrangements is that the state retains title to
the resources, recognizing that the ownership of the resource "rests with
the citizens of that country and not with private parties." 27 PSCs are
22. MARTIN SMITH, BURMA: INSURGENCY AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY 199 (1991).
23. U.N. Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, List of
Least Developed Countries, http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm (last visited
May 11, 2008).
24. Myan. Ministry of Energy, Incentives Granted by Union of Myanmar Foreign
Investment Law, http://www.energy.gov.mm/Incentivejl.htm (last visited May 11, 2008).
25. lan Holliday, Doing Business with Rights Violating Regimes: Corporate Social Responsibility
and Myanmar's Military Junta, 61 J. Bus. ETHICS 329, 334 (2005).
26. Mary P. Callahan, Burma: Soldiers as State Builders, in COERCION AND GOVERNANCE:
THE DECLINING POLITICAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN ASIA 413, 426 (Muthiah Alagappa ed.,
2001).
27. Janek Radon, How to Negotiate an Oil Agreement, in ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 89,
100 (Macartan Humphreys et al. eds., 2007). See also David Johnston, How to Evaluate the Fiscal
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intended to protect otherwise vulnerable resource-rich states from the
corporate pillage of the country's core assets, its natural resources. In
Burma, they effectively place the ownership of resources with the military
elite. There is no transparency in revenue flows and expenditures in the
extractive industries in Burma, no local participation in decisions regarding
development, and generally local people enjoy none of the benefits of
resource extraction projects, while being subjected to systematic human
rights abuses, aided and abetted by corporate actors. 28
III. THE YADANA GAS PROJECT
The Yadana natural gas project has set a standard of corporate
irresponsibility in the extractive industries. The project is being developed
by Chevron Corporation (United States; formerly Unocal), Total (France),
and PTTEP (Thailand) in partnership with the wholly state-owned MOGE.
Yadana officially began in 1992 and involved the construction of the Yadana
gas pipeline, during which the Burmese military was used to provide
pipeline security, a role it still performs today.
In the years 1996, 2000, 2001, and again in 2003, EarthRights
International (ERI) released reports with extensive on-the-ground
documentation of human rights abuses committed by the military in direct
connection to the construction of the pipeline project, including forced
labor,29 rape, torture, and extrajudicial killings.30 With no access to justice
in Burma, fifteen villagers, represented by ERI and a team of lawyers, 31
sued Unocal in U.S. courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)32 for
complicity in human rights abuses connected to the pipeline project. The
strength of the case against Unocal was evidence that the company knew
about, abetted, and benefited from the abuse, and did nothing to stop it,
and evidence that the abuse was directly connected to the pipeline project.
Citing this evidence of complicity, a U.S. federal court of appeals ruled that
Terms of Oil Contracts, in ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 53, 53-58 (Macartan Humphreys et al.
eds., 2007).
28. See EarthRights Int'l, THE HUMAN COST OF ENERGY 6 (2008), available at
http://www.earthrights.org/files/Burma%20Project/Yadana/HCoE-pages.pdf.
29. "The term 'forced or compulsory labor' shall mean all work or service which is
exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has
not offered himself voluntarily." Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (ILO
No. 29), art. 2, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55, available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/n0ilo29.htm.
30. See EARTHRIGHITS INT'L & SOUTHEAST ASIAN INFORMATION NETWORK, TOTAL DENIAL
(2000); EARTHRIGHTS INT'L & SOUTHEAST ASIAN INFORMATION NETWORK, TOTAL DENIAL
CONTINUES: EARTH RIGHTS ABUSES ALONG THE YADANA AND YETAGUN PIPELINES IN BURMA
(2001); EARTHRIGHTS INT'L, MORE OF THE SAME: FORCED LABOR CONTINUES IN BURMA (2001),
EARTHRIGHTS INT'L, TOTAL DENIAL CONTINUES: EARTH RIGHTS ABUSES ALONG THE YADANA
AND YETAGUN PIPELINES IN BURMA (2003) [hereinafter TOTAL DENIAL CONTINUES].
31. These lawyers included Dan Stormer, Anne Richardson, Cornelia Dai, and Patrick
Dunlevy at Hadsell & Stormer; Paul Hoffman at Schonbrun DeSimone Seplow Harris &
Hoffman; Judith Brown Chomsky; and Jennie Green at the Center for Constitutional Rights.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
[Vol. 11
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the case should be allowed to proceed to trial.33 This was followed by an
undisclosed out-of-court settlement in March 2005 between the plaintiffs
and the company.34 Shortly thereafter, Chevron announced that it was
seeking to acquire Unocal for U.S. $ 18 billion; 35 the deal was finalized in
August 2005.36
The landmark lawsuit Doe v. Unocal Corp. was important for the future
of corporate accountability in that it demonstrated that victims of human
rights abuses could achieve some measure of justice even where it was
otherwise absent in the victim's home country. 37 However, its overall
impact on the ground in Burma today is less evident, due in part to the
unchanged brutal nature of the military regime and the pipeline battalions,
and in part to the companies' continued failure to promote and protect
human rights in their project area. Serious human rights abuses connected
to the Yadana project continue in connection to the project.
A. Project History and Past Human Rights Abuses
In July 1992, Total signed a PSC with MOGE for exploration and
production of natural gas in the Andaman Sea. The gas deposit, called
Yadana, which in Burmese is used to refer to objects of religious veneration
and great worth, or treasure, holds approximately 5.3 trillion cubic feet (tcf)
of natural gas.38 It was originally discovered in the early 1980s but lacked
financing for the remainder of the decade. After a bidding process around
1991 that included Total, Unocal, PTTEP, and the MOGE, Total signed the
1992 PSC.39 Unocal-now Chevron-formally joined the consortium in
1993, followed by PTTEP of Thailand. The consortium partners of the
Yadana project now include Total (31.24%), Chevron (28.26%), PTTEP
(25.5%), and MOGE (15%). In February 1995, PTT signed a thirty-year sales
agreement to purchase the Yadana gas and began to implement ongoing
plans, with the consortium, for construction of a pipeline through the
33. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated by grant of rehearing en banc,
395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
34. See Daphne Eviatar, A Big Win for Human Rights, NATION, May 9, 2005, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20050509/eviatar.
35. Press Release, Chevron Corp., ChevronTexaco Announces Agreement to Acquire
Unocal (Apr. 4, 2005), available at http://www.chevron.com/news/press/Release/?id=2005-
04-04.
36. Justin Blum, Shareholders Vote in Favor of Unocal Acquisition, WASH. POsT, Aug. 11, 2005,
at D01.
37. This case and others like it elicited ongoing and sustained attacks on ATCA and
corporate liability from the Bush Administration, which, while wrong and misguided, served
to clarify corporate, partisan, and political interests against liability for human rights abuses
abroad. See Rick Herz, The Liberalizing Effects of Tort: How Corporate Complicity Liability Under
the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. (forthcoming
2008).
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Tennasarim Division in Burma and into Thailand. Official construction of
the pipeline took at least three years, occurring between 1995 and 1998, and
commercial sales to Thailand began in 2000, following construction of the
Thai power plants that were to receive the gas.40
The overland pipeline runs through Burma from the Andaman Sea to
Ratchaburi, Thailand, which feeds into the Ratchaburi and Wong Noi
power plants that supply electricity to the Bangkok metropolitan area. An
undersea pipeline was constructed to meet an onshore pipeline that
traverses approximately forty miles of farmland, villages, as well as dense,
hilly, and rugged jungle terrain, until it meets an overland pipeline on the
Thai side. The pipeline on the Burma side was constructed by the
consortium, and then picked up by PTT on the Thai side. According to
Chevron and Total, the pipeline area in Burma is home to at least 50,351
people as of 2006, and the companies recognize 36,688 people in the
twenty-five villages they consider to be within the "pipeline corridor."41
The military's preparations for "securing the pipeline corridor" for the
oil companies began as early as 1991, when plans for production of the
natural gas were in the early stages of development and when the
companies were negotiating contracts. At that time, the Burmese military
began moving into the pipeline corridor, first sending three Burmese Light
Infantry Battalions (LIBs) to build military barracks in an area that
previously had no permanent military outposts. 4 2 The barracks were built
with forced labor, and several additional battalions followed, including
two battalions referred to by locals and soldiers as "Total Battalions." 43
There were several direct links between the company, the pipeline, and
the human rights abuses, most notably the use of forced labor on pipeline
infrastructure, including building helicopter landing pads (helipads) along
the pipeline route, building roads, clearing the pipeline route, and
portering 4 for pipeline battalions tasked with securing the pipeline and the
pipeline area. Despite the military's reputation for serious human rights
abuses, the companies allowed the army to "recruit" laborers for the
project. Upon learning that forced labor was employed on the project, the
company paid some local villagers who had been forced by the military to
work-an implicit recognition by the company of forced labor, and one
that does not negate the forced nature of the work. In several cases, some
local villagers were paid directly by Total staff after they performed forced
labor.45 According to one local villager interviewed by ERI: "The Total
40. Total Corp., History of a Gas Project, The Pipeline Project,
http://burma.total.com/en/gazier/p-2_3.htm (last visited May 11, 2008).
41. Total Corp., The Pipeline Region and Its Inhabitants,
http://burma.total.com/en/contexte/p-l_4.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
42. Interview with Male, EarthRights Int'l Interview #05-2008, KaleinAung Village (Feb.
12, 2008). Interviewee notes that only battalions 25 and 103 would occasionally visit the area
prior to the pipeline project, but that there was no permanent military presence. See also
EARTHRIGHTS INTERNATIONAL, TOTAL DENIAL CONTINUES, supra note 39, at 23.
43. Id.
44. Portering involves carrying heavy loads for pipeline battalions as they patrol and
move through an area.
45. Id. at 88-90.
[Vol. 11
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employees were paying us village by village." 46 In some instances, the
military immediately forced the residents to hand over the money they had
received from Total after doing forced labor. In another interview
conducted by ERI, a villager stated: "The military did not say anything
after they took the money. They let us go back home. There was a big pile
of money in front of [the major]." 47 This particular villager fled his village
soon after. "I realized myself that I was not able to deal with this kind of
thing, so in desperation I escaped from them by leaving my village and all
my belongings, to come to the border area."48
Military deserters routinely noted that their primary function in the
area was to provide security for the pipeline and the multinational
corporations.49  Their mandate involved conscripting villagers for
portering. Villagers were tied together with rope, forced to porter heavy
loads of ammunition, food, and other supplies through the jungle,
resulting in numerous deaths.50
Soldiers who deserted the military told ERI that Total provided boots,
food, medical care, and payments to local pipeline security battalions, who
in turn abused local people in the area.5 ' The material support from the
company to the battalions was generally regarded by soldiers as payment
for the duty to "secure" the pipeline area for the junta and its foreign
corporate partners. Citing contracts, internal company memos and meeting
minutes, a U.S. federal court of appeals in the Unocal case found sufficient
evidence to raise the issue about whether the companies hired the military
to provide these services and whether the companies knew the military
was providing security. The same court found that there was some
evidence that might show that the companies knew about the abuses and
possibly collaborated with the military. 52
While the abuses were occurring, the companies brazenly espoused
corporate social responsibility (CSR) rhetoric. Unocal claimed that "[t]he
Yadana energy development project is helping to promote peace and
prosperity through the Myanmar-Thailand region. We offer this project as
a model of corporate responsibility in a developing country.., our goal at
Unocal is to operate as an 'island of integrity' wherever we do business."5 3
The reality was far from peaceful. To add insult to injury, when the
pipeline construction was completed, the military issued a non-negotiable
order that nine villages attend the opening ceremony for the pipeline.
46. See EARTHRIGHTS INT'L, TOTAL DENIAL CONTINUES, supra note 39, at 90-92.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 82-99.
50. See TOTAL DENIAL CONTINUES, supra note 39 at 58 ("There were so many way[s] that
the porters died, some suicides, sickness, exhaustion, stepping on land mines, trees falling on
them, and being killed.").
51. Id. at 82-99.
52. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated by grant of rehearing en banc,
395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003). See also EARTHRIGHTS INT'L, TOTAL DENIAL CONTINUES, supra note
39, at 90-92 (citing statements by corporate executives of Unocal and Total recognizing the use
of forced labor in the pipeline area).
53. See TOTAL DENIAL CONTINUES, supra note 39 at 122.
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Villagers were ordered to "smile and be happy."54
B. The Pipeline Area Today and Ongoing Human Rights Abuses
Over the years, Unocal, Chevron, and Total have faced a firestorm of
criticism both for investing in Burma and for the direct impacts of the
construction of their project, with a noteworthy lack of pressure placed on
PTTEP in Thailand. Chevron and Total have consistently denied any
wrongdoing and continue to defend their investment as a benefit to the
people living in the pipeline corridor and to society at large. Today, human
rights abuses connected to the project are continuing in the area, and
Burma as a whole is experiencing one of the most repressive and brutal
periods since military rule began in 1962.
From 2003-2008, ERI interviewed residents, recent refugees, and former
soldiers from fourteen villages in the area of the Yadana Pipeline. This
includes five of the twenty-five villages that Chevron and Total regard as
"pipeline villages,"5 5 and nine nearby villages which the companies do not
recognize as "pipeline villages."5 6 ERI recognizes these villages as relevant
due to their relative proximity to the Yadana pipeline and due to the fact
that abuses in these villages are being committed by pipeline security
battalions.
The ongoing abuses in the pipeline region committed by pipeline
security battalions from 2003 to the present day include a variety of forced
labor connected to the pipeline project, as well as land confiscation,
extortion, and violence. These abuses -explained in more detail below-
clearly indicate that the companies have not fulfilled their moral or legal
obligations under international law to respect, protect, and promote human
rights, and that the people in the area are suffering severe human rights
abuses directly linked to the Yadana pipeline project.
1. Militarization in the Pipeline Region
Since 1994, ERI has documented the presence of at least fourteen
infantry battalions that have regularly performed security directly
connected to the pipeline.5 7  A full-strength Burmese army battalion
comprises approximately 800 soldiers. According to ERI sources, the
pipeline-related battalions comprise approximately 400 to 500 soldiers per
battalion, totaling about 5,600 to 7,000 soldiers in 14 battalions whose
54. Id. at 125.
55. These villages are Michaunglaung, Zinba, Eindayaza, Kanbauk, and Kaleinaung.
56. These villages are Lawther, Kawlaing, Mayanchaung, Yapu, Ahlersekan, Chaungzone,
Shintabi, Natkyizin, and Kywetalin.
57. These are battalion numbers: 25, 104, 273, 282, 401,402, 403, 404,405, 406, 407, 408, 409,
and 410. Battalions 273 and 282 in particular have been widely known as "Total battalions."
Several other battalions have also operated in the pipeline region, although whether they
perform pipeline security functions has not been established. Interview with Male, age 50,
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mandate is, or at one time has been, pipeline security. Battalions 273, 282,
408, 409, and 410 are permanently stationed on the pipeline route,
comprising approximately 2,000-2,500 soldiers.58 Soldiers were not present
in the area prior to the pipeline project and there were no permanent bases,
with the exception of the occasional visit by soldiers from Infantry
Battalions 25 and 104.59 As of 2003, the militarization in the Yadana pipeline
area alone included at least thirty-nine military outposts, camps, barracks,
or bases.6° One villager in the pipeline corridor told ERI, "[a]fter the
foreigners came, the soldiers increased a lot.. .we the villagers had to work
for the soldiers, so I am sure that must be the foreigners who caused our
problems." 61
The pipeline is located in an area that has been home to an ongoing
ethnic conflict that has lasted approximately sixty years. According to
defected soldiers, the primary task of the pipeline battalions since the
project's inception has been to provide security for the pipeline itself and
for the foreign multinationals. The security mandate of the specific
battalions in the pipeline region was thus created by and for the pipeline
and the multinational corporations.
A defector from pipeline security Battalion 273, interviewed by ERI in
2008, describes his mandate as follows:
When I first arrived to the camp the commander told us that we
are here to protect the foreigners who are working on this project.
[We were told] it was a 30 years long project and the country got
half and foreigner got half amount of the benefit. And after 30
years the foreigner will leave and we will have all these supplies
and we will continue to have all of this. So it was important for us
that we are working for our country by taking security for these
foreigners who work on this project.62
This particular soldier volunteered for the military at age thirteen,
enduring brutal treatment through his training. He describes a systematic
and violent training process that was clearly designed to produce hardened
soldiers whom the SPDC deems fit to secure projects like Yadana and to
control ethnic populations:
During our stay there they are also treating us very badly, like for
58. See EARTHRIGHTS INT'L, TOTAL DENIAL CONTINUES, supra note 39 at 23; See also U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, REPORT ON LABOR PRACTIcES IN BURMA 48-
49(1998), available at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/ media/reports/ofr/burmal998/main.htm
(listing 10 different battalions active in the pipeline region at one time or another; basing
conclusions on a U.S. Embassy officer's 1996 report and a journalist who visited the region
and took a photograph of a map identifying the active battalions in the region in 1998).
59. ERI Interview #100, supra note 57.
60. EARTHRIGHTS INT'L, TOTAL DENIAL CONTINUES, supra note 39, at 20-21.
61. Id. at 69.
62. Interview with Defected Soldier, age 29, EarthRights Int'l Interview #06-2008, on Thai-
Burma border (Feb. 8, 2008) [hereinafter ERI Interview #06-2008].
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food they would give us morning glory that grew behind the toilet
and they would feed it to us. They also badly hit and punished
those who tried to escape from the camp. During my time there I
also learnt that some people joined by their will and some were
forced to join.63
Another soldier interviewed prior to 2003 described the primary
mandate of securing the pipeline, which included violations of the right to
be free from slavery. He stated that "[w]hen we were patrolling for the
safety of the pipeline, we always used the villagers as porters. In one
company, we separated into many groups and split up all over the area...
to take responsibility for securing the project. Therefore, we needed the
villagers to be porters. Each separate group took six or seven porters." 64
2. Forced Labor in Connection with the Yadana Pipeline
Since 1991, villagers in Burma have been forced to work for the benefit
of the Yadana pipeline project, including portering for pipeline security
battalions in order to secure the. project and the area for the junta and its
corporate partners. This involves being forced, under highly abusive
conditions and threats of death, to carry heavy loads for pipeline battalions
as they patrol the area, sometimes in dangerous or even mine-filled areas.
According to testimony gathered from 2003 to February 2008, these abuses
are continuing.
The use of forced labor in the pipeline area villages is systematic and
uniform. An order detailing the forced labor is usually issued from the
battalion to the village headman, who in turn communicates the order to
the villagers. Typically, one laborer from each household is required to
perform the forced labor according to each order, indiscriminate of age or
gender, except in the recruitment of forced porters for pipeline security, in
which case the soldiers reportedly prefer males. If a household or
individual is unable to work, they have the option to hire a replacement at
their own expense. However, given the poverty in the area, most villagers
opt instead to perform the forced labor. According to one villager from the
pipeline village of Kanbauk, "[wie cannot refuse to go with them." 65
"Going with them" often entails being forced to porter for pipeline
battalions as they secure the pipeline corridor, carrying heavy equipment
and ammunition, as well as food and other supplies. Villagers receive no
pay and often face violence inflicted by soldiers, which has consistently
been the case since the beginning of the project. One defector alluded to the
abuse, "We ask these people to carry shell ammunition, food and supplies.
.During the portering the soldiers treat porters not so good. I don't want
to mention about these bad things so much since I myself I have done it to
63. Id.
64. EARTHRIGHTS INT'L, TOTAL DENIAL CONTINUES, supra note 39, at 54.
65. Interview with Forced Laborer, EarthRights Int'l Interview #043, Kanbaunk Village
(June 30, 2005) [hereinafter ERI Interview #0431.
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these people as well at that time." 66
A villager in Michaunglaung interviewed by ERI in 2007 described
portering ammunition at least ten times per year for pipeline security
battalions: "Villagers had to go by rotation and had to carry food and
ammunition for them. The distance was two days and one night."67 A
villager from Kanbauk, another pipeline village, describes the frequency
and common economic impact of being forced to neglect his own survival
by instead portering for the military. "We have to go porter for them
whenever they arrive in the village. We do not have many villagers in the
village, so we have to go with them very often. We have no time to work
on our job. We have to go with them by rotation and the village head
arranges it."68
Another related type of forced labor involves escorting battalions from
village to village or through the jungle to "secure" the area. According to a
villager in the pipeline village of Michaunglaung, "[i]n 2006, I had to escort
LIB 408, 409, 410 and 282 several times and the soldiers always got food
from the villagers. The villagers also have to provide bamboo, leaves, and
clear the camp at the order of the battalions."69
3. Forced Security in the Pipeline Area: "I Just Pray to be Free From
This."
Villagers in the pipeline area are not only forced to porter for pipeline
security battalions, but they themselves are also forced to provide security
for the pipeline. Villagers in the pipeline corridor are forced to train for
and join civilian militias to provide security for the pipeline and the
pipeline region.70 This has occurred since at least 2001 through the present
day. Typically one member from each household is required to attend the
trainings, indiscriminate of age or gender. The trainings are between three
to four weeks long, and villagers are required to provide for themselves at
their own expense. Depending on the village, there are usually fifty to
eighty people in attendance at each of the trainings, including children.
"There were a lot of children under 18 years old and elders. About 50
people attended this training." 71
These trainings place a very difficult economic and mental burden on
66. Interview with Defected Soldier, age 29, EarthRights Int'l Interview #06-2008, on Thai-
Burma border (Feb 8, 2008) [hereinafter ERI Interview #06-2008].
67. Interview with Forced Laborer, EarthRights Int'l Interview #024, Michaunglaung
Village (Nov. 18, 2007) [hereinafter ERI Interview #024].
68. Interview with Forced Laborer, EarthRights Int'l Interview #045, Kanbauk Village
Uune 26, 2005) [hereinafter ERI Interview #045].
69. Interview with Forced Laborer, EarthRights Int'l Interview #025, Michaunglaung
Village (Nov. 18, 2007) [hereinafter ERI Interview #025].
70. While conscription of adults to a civilian militia is not necessarily a violation of
international law nor necessarily a human rights abuse, conscription of children, which is
occurring in the pipeline villages, is unlawful, and forced security for the pipeline has
occurred by individuals who have not been trained for the militia, making it forced labor.
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local people. In 2005, the chief of a pipeline security battalion visited
Kanbauk village and spoke about security, after which the village head was
ordered to enlist one member from each household in a militia training.
One local villager from Kanbauk village, who ekes out a living logging
with a manual saw, described the stress accompanying the difficult
decision to send his nineteen-year-old son to the training: "I could not
attend this training by myself," he says, "due to my responsibility toward
my family." 72 He and his wife had to prepare enough food and water in
advance for his son to take to the month long training. "We had to bring
everything from our house because they had no food to feed us in the
training. That was a big problem for us because we live hand-to-mouth...
in the village."73 Sending his son to the month-long militia training meant
he had to hire someone in his son's place at 2000 kyat per day. The mental
stress further affected his livelihood:
When my son was in the soldier training, I could not sleep well at
nighttime because of fear and anxiety. It distressed my state of
mind very much. When he finished attending the training, [after]
one month, another section was forced to attend the training again,
and so on... I did not want anyone from my family to attend this
training, but after giving our name to the village head, we had to
attend. We could not leave. If we did, this battalion would punish
the relatives of our family.74
Adding to the burden, the villages are also required to provide
monthly financial support to the soldiers for the militias. 75
Violence and beatings at the trainings are common. In the village of
Lawther, a village headman described being beaten by a soldier from a
pipeline security battalion after he was late in arriving for the militia
training. He and another villager were beaten in front of the other forced
participants in the militia training. "Because we had to travel so far, we
were late by about less than an hour, and he was angry at me and he beat
me several times. He also beat my villager who was there for the training
too." 76
These and other reasons have led many families to flee their village for
the Thai-Burma border, which is the clearest indication that life in the
"pipeline villages" has not improved, as the companies claim.77 According
to a villager from Ahlersekan:
72. ERI Interview #043, supra note 65.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. EarthRights Int'l Interview #044, Kanbauk Village (June 25, 2005) [hereinafter ERI
Interview #044].
76. EarthRights Int'l Interview #016, Lawther Village (2007) [hereinafter ERI Interview
#016].
77. For Chevron's claims that its operations benefit local people in the pipeline corridor,
see Press Release, Chevron Corp., Update to Chevron Statement on Myanmar (Oct. 18, 2008),
available at http://www.chevron.com/news/press/Release/ ?id =2007-10-18a.
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We also heard that villagers from our village will . . . be forced to
attend soldier trainings like other villages ... This news horrifies
the villagers very much. And some of them moved to other
villages and some are sneaking into Thailand; it makes the village
complicated. I do not know what is going to happen to our village
because we are under their control and they can do as they wish.
The people from other villages said that they had to spend three
weeks in the soldiers' training, and they also have to pay money to
the trainer of the school. I just pray to be free from this.78
After the training segment is complete, villagers then begin rotational
duty providing security in the area for the junta and its corporate partners.
According to a villager from the pipeline village Zinba, while most people
are subject to security duty, sometimes guard duty can be avoided by
performing other types of forced labor:
The people militia duty [in our village] started [in 2003] and
continues. Now three people from the village have to go every
three days to be a guard. We rotate, so it takes about two months
before it is your turn again. As for my house, we don't have to do
it because we have a bullock cart. Instead, we have to work on
other projects. 79
One form of security duty is providing twenty-four hour sentry duty in
huts located near the pipeline on a road that runs along the pipeline.
Similar to forced portering, this is labor that is in part a service to secure
the pipeline area for the junta and its corporate partners. Villagers fulfill
their duty in sentry huts that, according to interviews, were constructed
with forced labor around 2003 and are positioned along the road near the
Yadana pipeline. According to a villager from Yapu:
We had to do it on a rotational basis and each time 10 persons had
to go... Each time took one day and I had to go almost 10 times to
finish [building the huts and fences]. We had to clean the ground,
build a small hut, then around the hut we had to build two fences
next to each other. Between them we had to build the ground as
high as about 4-5 feet. And outside the fence we had to dig a
communication line around the fence from outside. We had to
build another fence, outside the first fence, with a bamboo trap and
it was about 10-20 yards away from the inside fence. It took more
78. EarthRights Int'l Interview #054, Ahlersekan Village (June 30, 2005) [hereinafter ERI
Interview #054].
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than a week to finish one camp.s°
The same villager recounts the intimidation, fear, and work involved
with providing forced labor to the Burmese soldiers:
While we were building the camp, the soldiers are around and
watching us. About four soldiers including two police officers are
settled in each sentry. We had to work from 6 A.M. until 5 P.M.
During that time we could not take a rest, otherwise the soldier
would shout at us, swear, or sometimes they even scared us by
firing their guns... After we finished building the sentry post we
also had to stand guard with the soldier ... In the night time we
have to be a guard.81
Typically, three people are assigned to a hut in which they must stay
for a full 24-hour period. They must provide their own food and
sometimes their own weapons, they are not allowed to sleep, and they
theoretically must devote undivided attention to sentry duty.
In 2007, one villager from the pipeline village of Kanbauk told ERI, "if
we were caught sleeping by the patrol soldier, we would surely be beaten
or scolded... If we'd like to sleep, one or two people had to keep watch for
the patrol soldier. We began working in March [20051 until the present
time. We couldn't refuse to go for this." As with the militia trainings,
"there are many elders over 60 years old and children under 18 years old
that are forced to work on this kind of forced labor."
82
Another type of forced labor in the area in service of pipeline battalions
consists of work on military barracks in the pipeline corridor. According to
those interviewed by ERI, this type of forced labor is quite common, and
after the initial construction of military barracks like the one in
Michaunglaung, villagers are systematically forced to work on barrack
maintenance, including gathering bamboo and leaves. According to one
villager from Michaulaung, who recently arrived at the Thai border, "I had
to work for the military camp at leas[t] 4 times per month [since 1999] and I
had to build the roof of the barrack, build bunkers, trenches, provide
bamboo and leaves for the military camps." 83
Another common type of forced labor in connection to the pipeline
project involves forced roadwork on the road used by pipeline security and
oil company staff. Chevron takes credit for "[i]mprovements to local
roads,"84 and according to Total, one of these is the road to Zinba village, in
80. Interview with Forced Laborer, EarthRights Int'l Interview #040, Michaunglaung
Village (July, 2003) [hereinafter ERI Interview #040].
81. Id.
82. ERI Interview #043, supra note 65.
83. ERI Interview #024, supra note 67.
84. Chevron Press Release, supra note 77.
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close proximity to the pipeline route. 85 While the companies facilitated
construction of this road, forced labor is regularly conscripted to maintain
it. This is most common before the rainy season to prepare the road for the
rain, and after the rainy season to repair the road from damage caused by
the rains. "Every year we have to repair the road built between
Kaleinaung and our village Zinba. It was about 2-3 miles in distance. We
have to repair one part [in Zinba] and Kaleinaung village had to repair the
other part ... Each time about 50 villagers had to go. It included women
and children . . . The road is used by villagers as well as the Total
company." 86 Another villager from Zinba claims:
In our village, we have one road that links to Kaleinaung village,
which is about a mile and a half away. Foreigners constructed it a
few years ago and the road is level with pieces of rock. Now we
have to maintain the condition of the road. Two of my friends and
I are in charge of looking after the road. The village head told us to
do this. We do not get any payment; we have to do it free, but by
doing this we don't have to go for other forced labor work. 87
This and other types of forced labor continue in full view of the
expatriate employees of the oil companies. The companies claim that since
fieldwork commenced in the 1990s they have "always monitored the
Army's actions very closely to prevent forced labor." 88 A villager from the
pipeline village of Michaunglaung, however, explains that he has to do
forced labor regularly for pipeline security battalions, and that this is often
in plain view of the expatriate staff of the oil companies. Moreover, he
claims that when foreigners come to the village inquiring about forced
labor, fear prevents the truth from coming out:
Our village is one of the 13 villages under the Total company's
development zone, but we still have to work on forced labor. The
foreigners saw what we have to do but they don't say anything to
us. They pass by in their truck while we are building sentry posts
and cleaning bushes along the road. But they don't stop to ask us
anything. A few times I heard foreigners come to the village and
ask whether or not we have to do forced labor. But no one dares
say anything about it when they ask because people are afraid of
the consequences.89
Another villager from the pipeline village of Eindayaza, which is an
85. Total Corp., Infrastructure, http://burma.total.com/en/engagement/p_3_3_4.htm
(last visited May 7, 2008).
86. ERI Interview #024, supra note 67.
87. ERI Interview #009, supra note 79.
88. Total Corp., The Allegations and Total's Response,
http://burma.total.com/en/controverse/p_4-l.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
89. ERI Interview #040, supra note 80.
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ethnically Karen village close to Total's local headquarters, likewise
explains to ERI that forced labor continues in plain view of foreign oil
company staff. He claims the foreigners have come to the village inquiring
about forced labor, but even the village head is not allowed to speak
directly to the foreigners, but rather through a translator, and the local
villagers do not know nor trust what the translator is saying to the
foreigners. 90
These accounts do not easily correspond with the companies' claims to
have fostered a close relationship with local people based on trust, nor is it
consistent with the companies' claims regarding the benefits of the project
and their commitment to protecting and promoting human rights in the
pipeline area.
Nonetheless, the companies continue to claim that the pipeline project
is benefiting the people in the region and improving their lives. After the
junta's violent crackdown on the monk-led pro-democracy protests from
August to October 2007, the world's attention was briefly focused on the
plight of the people in Burma and the companies faced a firestorm of
negative criticism for their partnerships with the regime. In response, Total
claimed: "[w]e are convinced that through our presence we are helping to
improve the daily lives of tens of thousands of people who benefit from
our social and economic initiatives."91 Likewise, Chevron claimed, "[o]ur
community development programs also help improve the lives of the
people they touch and thereby communicate our values, including respect
for human rights." 92 And, not to be left out, Thailand's PTTEP claimed,
"[w]e have invested in Burma over the past decade. Despite the political
conflict, the benefits from the projects will go to people of both countries." 93
4. Livelihood in the Pipeline Area
John Keane writes of fear generated by violence as "profoundly anti-
democratic," claiming it "eats the souls of civilians... It erodes or destroys
their capacity to make judgments and to act in solidarity with, and against,
other civilians."94 This is the demonstrated strategy of the Burmese junta in
the resource-rich ethnic areas of Burma - divide and conquer - including
the area of the Yadana pipeline, where civilians are subjected to brutal
violence by pipeline security battalions on behalf of the companies and the
Yadana project.
One villager from Lawther recently told ERI about his experience
collecting logs for pipeline security battalions. The soldiers arrived to take
the logs but also attempted to take logs that were intended for a local
90. Interview with Forced Laborer, EarthRights Int'l Interview #007, Kanbauk Village
(Jan. 2004) [hereinafter ERI Interview #007].
91. HUM. RTS. WATCH, BURMA: FOREIGN OIL AND GAS INVESTORS SHORE UP JUNTA, Select
Company Statements at 4 (Nov. 2007),
http://hrw.org/campaigns/burma/drilIing/ Burma-companystatements.pdf.
92. Id. at 1.
93. Id. at 4.
94. JOHN KEANE, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY 122-23 (2004).
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school. His attempts to prevent the soldiers from taking the school's logs
were met with violence. "They didn't listen to me but instead the officer ...
turned to me and he slapped my face twice, then he punched my stomach
and when I tried to cover it he kicked my groin. I fell on the ground ... I
had to wait for a while to be able to walk."95 The man later fled to the Thai-
Burma border for medical treatment in a refugee camp after finding
inadequate medical attention in his village. According to his wife, "We
don't have enough money to go to the hospital so we decided to come to
the border."96
Violence is sometimes intentionally perpetrated by pipeline security
battalions in front of large groups of villagers-a classic and common tactic
to instill fear and control the population mentally and physically. These
violent displays of power are not simply in service to the SPDC's continued
rule, but also to its corporate partners, ensuring the protection of the
pipeline project through physical violence. At a village meeting in Lawther
called by pipeline security battalion, four villagers were beaten in front of
the entire village to set an example after the captain of one of the battalions
said he suspected the village of feeding troops from an armed government-
opposition group. When the display of power was deemed complete,
villagers were then selected and forced to porter for the pipeline security
soldiers. "No one wanted to go but people cannot do anything because
they were captured and forced to go."9 7
In the late 1990s the War Office of the SPDC declared a policy of self-
reliance for local units of the enormous Burmese tatmadaw, largely out of
necessity because of the SPDC's poor management of the rapid growth in
size of the military. 98 Military units dispersed throughout the country were
tasked with generating their own operating revenue from the local
economy.. To this end, human rights abuses were evidently not
discouraged, especially in ethnic areas such as the Yadana pipeline corridor;
an area of primary concern to central command and economically crucial to
the regime's survival.
Nearly every villager and recent refugee interviewed by ERI from 2003
to 2008 described arbitrary taxation and systematic extortion by pipeline
security soldiers. Several of the pipeline villages do not host a permanent
barrack, but soldiers are constantly present, often staying in the houses of
local people who have no option but to accommodate the soldiers, lest they
face violence or some other form of punishment. One village headman
noted, "It becomes a habit of welcoming the Burmese soldiers." 99
Typically, villagers are required to pay pipeline security battalions
when they enter the village, as well as provide food, drink, and
95. ERI Interview #016, supra note 76.
96. EarthRights Int'l Interview #017, Lawther Village (2007) [hereinafter ERI Interview
#0171. Contrary to the testimony of local villagers gathered by ERI, Chevron and Total claim
that 50,000 people in the pipeline region have access to free healthcare due to the company's
socio-economic program. See Chevron Press Release, supra note 77.
97. EarthRights Int'l Interview #031, Lawther Village June 2003).
98. CALLAHAN, supra note 12, at 46.
99. ERI Interview #043, supra note 65.
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accommodation. According to one villager interviewed in 2005, "We can
not say 'no' to them because we would suffer in saying this word. They
don't care whether we are rich or poor, women or children, widow or
elders. We all have to pay them, as they demand."10 0
Low to high-level soldiers from pipeline security battalions routinely
confiscate goods from the local shops in the pipeline area villages. "They
take whatever they want from the village shops and the village head has to
pay the shop owner later." 1 1 When the pipeline soldiers leave the village,
it is the headman's responsibility to restore the economic balance and find
a way to compensate local people for their losses. This is usually achieved
by further contributions of villagers, who already are living under severe
poverty and food insecurity, in some cases due to land confiscation by the
military.
Residents in the pipeline area also describe being forced to make
payments to soldiers for thinly veiled schemes designed as community
programs. According to a villager living in Lawther, interviewed in 2007:
Almost once or twice a month, soldiers come into our village to sell
us tickets for the military fund. They title them with many things,
sometimes for a mother and children's fund, sometimes just for the
military fund. Similarly, they would organize a food festival in
Kaleinaung and they would come and sell tickets to us in Lawther.
We were forced to buy the tickets but no one really could go and
eat as we would have to travel almost a half-day to eat just one
bowl of noodles.10 2
Villagers in the pipeline area are also being forced by soldiers to plant
jatropha-also referred to as the castor plant or physic nut-as part of a
nationwide bio-fuel program aimed at building an alternative source of
energy for the country, as well as a new export. The junta's commitment to
this program has been described as "fanaticism;" the generals have set a
quota of 500,000 acres for each of the fourteen states and divisions, aiming
to blanket the country with seven million acres of the plant,1°3 creating a
climate of competition between regional commanders to meet the quota. In
February 2006, in the New Light of Myanmar, Brigadier General Hla Htay
Win, Yangon Regional Commander, claimed that "[p]hysic nut oil can be
used to meet the fuel needs of the nation to some extent and it will be
useful for the people in the long run and it is necessary to grow the plant
widely throughout our country." 10 4 In 2007, a senior Energy Ministry
official was quoted in Singapore as saying to oil industry executives that
100. ERI Interview #045, supra note 68.
101. ERI Interview #053, supra note 71.
102. ERI Interview #016, supra note 76.
103. Vicky Bowman, The Political Situation in Myanmar, in MYANMAR, THE STATE,
COMMUNITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1, 10 (Monique Skidmore & Trevor Wilson eds., 2007).
104. Mary Callahan, Of Kyay-Zu and Kyet-in, Skidmore & Wilson, supra note 12 at 49.
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the jatropha plantations would be ready by mid-year.05 To date, Burma
lacks the capacity to process physic nuts into biodiesel fuel, as no
processing plants have been constructed.10 6
The planting of jatropha in Burma is not encouraged, it is forced.
Villagers are forced to buy seeds from the township authority, clear land,
and plant the seeds. According to ERI interviews, this program began in
the pipeline region in 2006, followed by another forced planting in 2007.
According to a villager from the pipeline village of Eindayaza, "[We] have
to buy the seeds and plant this for the SPDC. The SPDC does not pay any
wages. We had to plant it last year and this year. My husband had to clear
the plantation place.. .so we could plant it. One time it took two weeks to
finish planting."107
Overall, the Yadana project is one of the world's worst development
projects in terms of impacts on local people and corporate complicity in
human rights abuses. Abuses connected to the project, committed in the
name of energy security, began in the 1990s and are continuing today. As
described above, the project led to a rapid increase in militarization in an
area that previously had no permanent military presence, and local people
have continued to face a range of human rights abuses committed by
military battalions tasked with securing the pipeline and surrounding
areas. Residents continue to suffer forced labor related to the project, they
are forced to provide security for the pipeline, and their livelihoods are, in
their own words, worse off than before the project began, as they face
regular extortion and the forced planting of jatropha. Despite these abuses,
and the companies' well-documented complicity, Chevron and Total
continue to push the boundaries of corporate whitewash by claiming the
Yadana project benefits local people.
IV. THE SHwE GAS PROJECT
The overland portion of the Yadana pipeline in Burma is approximately
thirty-nine miles long and has led to thousands of human rights abuses
beginning in 1991 and continuing today, seventeen years later. Tragically, a
similar scenario is just beginning. Plans between MOGE and PetroChina
are reportedly underway to construct a new 1,479 mile overland gas
pipeline from Arakan State on the west coast of Burma to Kunming,
Yunnan Province, China. If constructed, this pipeline will traverse at least
twenty-four townships in Burma, through Arakan State, Magwe Division,
Mandalay Division, and Shan State. It will be nearly forty times as long as
the Yadana pipeline.
Since the Yadana pipeline was completed, it has been the largest source
105. Ed Cropley, Myanmar Biofuel Effort Raises Doubts, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 12, 2008,
available at http:/ / www.iht.com/articles/ 2008/03/12/ business/ biofuel.php.
106. Id.




Smith and Htoo: Energy Security:, Security for Whom?
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
of revenue for the Burmese military regime. 108  But the Shwe project,
named for the Burmese word for gold, surpasses Yadana in its income-
generating potential for the junta and would also be a considerable source
of revenue for gas companies who obtain PSCs. At 5.7-10 tcf of gas, the
deposits will earn the junta an estimated U.S. $ 12-17 billion, according to
Shwe Gas Movement (SGM), and they will earn Daewoo approximately
U.S. $ 90 million per year for the estimated twenty year life of the project.
109
Given the history of natural gas production in Burma and the
unchanged nature of the military regime, a project of this magnitude at this
time will undoubtedly lead to serious human rights abuses. It is being
actively opposed by the SGM, an international movement coordinated by
activists from Arakan State, Burma." 0
A. Project History
The Shwe project is currently in the exploration phase, but it was
conceived on August 4, 2000, when Daewoo entered into a production
sharing contract with MOGE to explore and exploit natural gas in block A-
1, an offshore block in Burma's Bay of Bengal."' On December 26, 2001,
the company sold a ten percent stake to the state-owned Korea Gas
Corporation (KOGAS),112 and approximately one month later the company
rounded out the consortium by announcing that it would sell a twenty
percent stake to ONGC Videsh and a ten percent stake to the Gas
Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL), both state-owned Indian companies." 3
Daewoo reportedly received financing for the Shwe project from the Korean
government through the government's Special Account Law for energy
and resource businesses, which was enacted in 1994 and has since been
108. ERI's calculations, based on statements from the companies and documents released
in the partial trial of Doe v. Unocal, suggest that at the end of 2007 the Yadana Project was
taking in over U.S. $ 3.5 million daily, or nearly U.S. $ 1.3 billion annually. Nearly 75% of this
income goes to the military regime-$969 million annually, based on fuel prices at the end of
2007, and conceivably much more if these prices continue to rise. See EARTHRIGHTS INT'L, THE
HUMAN COST OF ENERGY 21 (2008), available at
http://www.earthrights.org/ files/ Burma%20Project/Yadana/ HCoE.pages.pdf.
109. See SHWE GAS MOVEMENT, SUPPLY AND COMMAND 2, 51 (2006), available at
http://www.shwe.org.
110. See The Shwe Gas Movement, Campaign Goals,
http://www.shwe.org/the-shwe-gas-movement/campaign-goals (last visited Mar. 26,
2008).
111. South Korea's Daewoo urged to pull out of Burma gas deal, BBC WORLDWIDE
MONITORING, Oct. 17, 2005. See also SUPPLY AND COMMAND, supra note 109, at 1.
112. Daewoo Int'l Corp., Daewoo International Sells Stake in Myanmar field to KOGAS
(Dec. 27, 2001),
http://www.daewoo.com/english/publicity/news.jsp?work=read&u-id=280&now-page=1
&keyword=Daewoo%201nternational% 20sels% 20stake%20in%20Myanmar%20field %20to%2
OKOGAS&keytype=subject&nav=null.
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revised nine times. Daewoo reportedly receives approximately U.S. $ 22.52
million from this fund." 4
The offshore blocks had reportedly been explored by foreign and local
companies since 1947, with no positive results."5 On November 21, 2003
Daewoo began test drilling block A-i, and on December 26, 2003
discovered a "world-class commercial-scale gas deposit."" 6 The military
junta then gave Daewoo the rights to explore neighboring block A-3, and
the company finalized a U.S. $90 million budget for drilling exploration." 7
Estimates of the total combined reserves in blocks A-1 and A-3 have varied
over time; they could hold between 4.5 and 7.7 tcf of recoverable reserves'1 8
or as much 10tcf,119 compared with Yadana's 5.3 tcf.
Local people have not been involved in any decisions regarding the
project nor have they been consulted regarding options for the gas project;
they are largely unaware of it. Furthermore, the companies have not
publicly discussed the current or potential impacts of their project on
society, nor have they conducted environmental or human rights impact
assessments.
B. China Pipeline
The destination of the Shwe gas was for years subject to a fierce bidding
war between India, South Korea, Thailand, and China. The likeliest end-
user was thought to be India, via pipeline, and there were four potential
pipeline routes under consideration to transport the gas to India. 20 South
Korea's proposal was less economical, involving construction of a liquefied
natural gas (LNG) plant in Sittwe in order to ship LNG overseas to Korea.
Thailand hoped to pipe the gas to Thailand, and China likewise hoped to
pipe the gas to Kunming Province. In August 2007, reports emerged that
the Burmese military confirmed that the natural gas from the Shwe gas
project will be sold to China,121 and in a November 27, 2007 interview with
the Korea Economic Daily, Daewoo's Chief Executive Kang Young Won
claimed that the company is in talks to sell Burma's gas to PetroChina,
114. See Foreign Oil Development Support Amount at US$191 Million, SEOUL ECON.
NEWSPAPER, Oct. 6, 2005 (in Korean language).
115. Kyaw Thu, Daewoo's Massive Gas Strike Puts Rakhine Region in Spotlight, MYAN. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 2007, available at http://www.mmtimes.com/feature/energy/017.htm.
116. Embassy Newsletter, World-Class Commercial Scale Gas Deposit Found at Offshore
Rakhine Coast (Feb. 2004), http://www.mewashingtoncd/ISSUE-No 2_FEB2004_TEXT.htm.
117. Daewoo lnt'l Corp., Daewoo International Myanmar Gas Mine (Apr. 20, 2004),
http://www.daewoo.com/english/publicity/news.jsp?work=read&u id=1272&now-page=1
&keyword=90%20million&keytype=content&nav=null.
118. See Int'l Hum. Rts. Clinic, Hum. Rts Prog., Harvard Law School, Request for Policy
Recommendations and Investigation, A Petition to the National Human Rights Commission
of Korea, Apr. 17, 2008, at 2; see also Ko Kyoung Tae, Daewoo verifies Myanmar gas find, KOREAN
HERALD, Aug. 23, 2007.
119. SUPPLY AND COMMAND, supra note 109, at 11-12.
120. EARTHRIGHTS IN'rL, ANOTHER YADANA, supra note 38.
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which will involve construction of the aforementioned overland gas
pipeline from Arakan State, Burma to Kunming in Yunnan Province,
China. 122 The decision to sell the gas to China, however, is widely thought
to have been made by the junta, not the consortium developing the project,
despite China's offer of a less competitive price for the gas. Analysts agree
that China was most likely awarded the gas because it can offer the junta
something its competitors cannot: protection at the United Nations. 123
A pipeline through Burma to Kunming, China will very likely result in
serious human rights abuses. Abuses in Arakan State are already common,
including forced labor for the construction of military barracks, roads, and
other infrastructure, forced portering, forced security, land confiscation
and forced displacement, extortion, and violence. 24 There are several
ongoing development projects in Shan State that have had serious human
rights impacts, including forced displacement in connection with the
proposed Tasang Dam and the Shweli Dam, and numerous large and small
scale mining projects with a considerable impact on local communities and
the environment. The proposed China pipeline will most likely cross the
border near the Chinese border town of Ruili, not far from the Shweli dam
site. The Shweli dam is being developed by several Chinese companies
and the Asia World Corporation, and it began with the establishment of a
permanent battalion in 2000, followed by systematic human rights abuses,
including forced labor and land confiscation.125 The first hydropower
turbine is schedule to produce electricity by the end of 2008, and the
electricity is intended not for the local people but for three local large-scale
mines-namely the Namtu Copper mine, the Monywa Copper Project 126
and the Thabeik Kyinn mine-each of which produce a considerable
amount of revenue for the junta.
C. Future Pipelines to India
The proposed Shwe pipeline to India is unlikely in light of reports that
the regime is in talks with CNPC/PetroChina, but future pipelines to India
are likely to simply come from other gas deposits. During the recent pro-
122. Sungwoo Park & Manash Goswami, Chinese Bidder Wins Myanmar Natural Gas Rights,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 5, 2008, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/12/05/bloomberg/sxchigas.php.
123. Sean Turnell, Gas Attack, WALL STREET J. ONLINE, Sept. 04, 2007, available at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs4/Gas-Attack-Sean-Turnell.pdf.
124. See SUPPLY AND COMMAND, supra note 109.
125. PALAUNG YOUTH NETWORK GROUP, UNDER THE BOOT 22 (2007), available at
http://www.salween.org./downloads/Underthe BootEnglish.pdf.
126. The Monywa Copper Project was being developed by the Canadian company
Ivanhoe Mines in joint partnership with the Myanmar Ministry of Mines. As a result of
pressure from Rio Tinto-Ivanhoe's partner in a large copper-gold mine in Mongolia-the
company transferred its assets in Burma to an independent trust tasked with selling Ivanhoe's
stake in the mine. Prospective buyers of the Monywa Copper Project include a Korean
consortium led by Daewoo International. See Matthew Smith, The Environmental Governance of
Mining in Burma 218, in MYANMAR: THE STATE, COMMUNITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 218, 232
(Monique Skidmore & Trevor Wilson eds., 2007).
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democracy protests in Burma, India's Petroleum Minister Murli Deora
traveled to Burma with executives of the national oil company ONGC
Videsh and signed a new PSC for natural gas exploration and production
of three deep-water exploration blocks.127 Likewise, India's Essar Oil, a
privately owned firm, recently began test drilling an onshore natural gas
block in Sittwe, which was originally agreed upon in PSCs signed in 2005.
A pipeline to India would very likely run along the Kaladan River,
where approximately one million people live in townships along the
river. 28 Barring underwater passage from the Bay of Bengal to India, any
overland pipeline to India would traverse Arakan and Chin states, where
human rights abuses are ongoing and militarization is increasing. After
1988, the number of battalions in the Western Command (including areas
of Arakan and Chin States) increased dramatically, from three to forty-
three Infantry Battalions. 129 The military presence has likewise increased
the number of human rights abuses, including forced labor on military
barracks, roads and other infrastructure, forced portering, land
confiscation, extortion, and violence.
D. EIA/HRIA
According to Tun Myint, "[e]nvironmental governance is an inherently
political process." 130 Many writers note that environmental permitting,
meaning the decision to proceed with a project that will have an
environmental footprint, is a political choice resulting from societal values
and expectations. 131 Today's best practices in the extractive industries
prescribe that this political choice include local and possibly dissenting
voices through the implementation of fair and efficient Environmental
Impact Assessments (ElAs) and Human Rights Impact Assessments
(HRIAs), each of which are imbued with democratic values and require
active public participation. EIAs are meant to maximize the potential for
environmentally sound and sustainable development by integrating
environmental issues into development planning, 32 and HRIAs are meant
127. Murli Deora Witnesses Signing of PSCs by OVLfor 3 Myanmar Deepwater Blocks, ONGC
VIDESH NEWS, Sept. 24, 2007, available at
http://www.ongcvidesh.com/displayl.asp?fol-name=news&filename=newsl39&get-pic=
&pjtitle=NEWS. See also Myanmar Activists Protest Murli Deora's Visit, REUTERS, Sept. 24, 2007,
available at http://in.reuters.com/article/topNews/idINlndia-29693820070924 [hereinafter
Myanmar Activists Protest]; Brian McCartan, Myanmar Deal Right Neighborly of India, ASIA
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2008.
128. SUPPLY AND COMMAND, supra note 90, at 15.
129. Id. at22.
130. Myint, Tun, Democracy in Global Environmental Governance: Issues, Interests, and Actors
in the Mekong and the Rhine, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 287, 292.
131. See S.A. JOYCE & MAGNUS MACFARLANE, SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE MINING
INDUSTRY: CURRENT SITUATION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 4 (2001), available at
http://www.iied.org/mmsd/mmsd-pdfs/social-impact-assessment.pdf.
132. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (1998);
John Knox, The Myth and Reality of Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 291 (2002); Jon M. Van Dyke, Sea Shipment of Japanese Plutonium Under International
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to assess the immediate and wider impact a project could have on the
human rights situation in the country.
Daewoo International has been in Burma for the Shwe project since
2000 and has yet to publicly discuss human rights or other social and
environmental concerns in any serious way, let alone conduct objective
third party impact assessments. On the contrary, in reference to the Shwe
gas project, Daewoo stated on July 11, 2006 that human rights issues are
not a relevant conversation until the project is at the production stage.
"Our position is that it's not the right time to discuss a human rights abuse
issue because we are still at a stage of exploring the gas field and have yet
to begin development." 133 The statement denies a fundamental principle of
impact assessments, namely that they occur "before significant activity
begins," 134 not during or after a project.
GAIL has likewise expressed similar disregard for the potential human
rights impacts of its presence in Burma. When the Shwe pipeline was still
intended for India, GAIL told Fortune Magazine: "as far as we're concerned,
we will implement the pipeline inside India." 135 Regarding human rights
abuses potentially connected to the project, GAIL claimed, "What they do
there is their business. We hope they proceed by international laws, ethics,
and norms."136
On November 16, 2006, ERI and the Korean Federation for
Environmental Movement issued letters to Daewoo and KOGAS calling on
the companies to conduct an EIA in compliance with international law, as
well as an HRIA. 137 The letters outline the international law and Korean
law requirements for conducting EIAs, both of which are being neglected
in the Shwe project, as well as the major concerns regarding the Shwe gas
project. The companies have not acknowledged or responded to the
letters.
E. Guns for Gas
In May 2002, Lee Tae-yong and representatives from six other South
Korean corporations signed a U.S. $ 133.8 million contract with the
Burmese military regime to secretly provide materials to help the junta
manufacture six types of artillery shells at a state-owned weapons factory
Law, 24 OCEAN DEV. & INTL L. 399 (1993); Nicholas Robinson, International Trends in
Environmental Impact Assessment, 19 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 591 (1992).
133. N. Wong-Anan, Korean, Indian firms urged to withdraw from Myanmar, REUTERS, July
11, 2006.
134. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report on the Issue of Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, delivered to the General
Assembly (Feb. 9, 2007) U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/035.
135. Daniel Pepper, Myanmar: In Harm's Way, FORTUNE, Nov. 20, 2006, at 36-37.
136. Id.
137. Korean Federation for Environmental Movement et. al, The Joint Statement of Korea
for the Third International Action Day Against Korea's Involvement in Shwe Gas
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in Pyay, Burma. 38 Between October 2002 and October 2006, nearly 480
pieces of equipment and parts were exported from Korea for this factory.
Korean law prohibits the unauthorized export of strategic materials to
Burma. In December 2006, fourteen high level executives from a total of
seven firms, including former Daewoo President and Chief Executive Lee
Tae-yong, were indicted for violating trade restrictions and faced trial in
Seoul. On November 15, 2007, all fourteen executives were found guilty
and were given sentences that met with international criticism for their
leniency. 39  While unrelated to natural gas production, the situation
reveals Daewoo International's questionable regard for corporate
responsibility generally and in Burma.
V. ENERGY SECURITY AND BURMA
Energy security -sustainable access to relatively affordable energy for
the foreseeable future-is, in a certain sense, a contradiction in terms.
Because it involves the extraction of non-renewable natural resources,
namely oil and gas, it is inherently unsustainable beyond a certain time
horizon. It is also directly connected to human rights abuses, making it
inherently insecure, at least where human safety is concerned.
The precise meaning of energy security for policy purposes varies
according to context. For some governments, like the United States, energy
security means relying less on foreign energy sources. For others, like
India, China, and Thailand, it means relying more on foreign sources,
which for those countries is a break from previous policies of self-
sufficiency 40 For resource-rich states that rely on oil and gas export
revenues, like military-ruled Burma, energy security can involve
maintaining a steady demand,141 using resources as diplomatic leverage, 142
or negotiating with foreign companies for a favorable share of the
138. 14 South Koreans convicted of illegally exporting weapons technology, equipment to
Myanmar, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 15, 2007, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/15/asia/AS-GEN-SKorea-Myanmar-Arms-
Export.php.
139. Id. See also Shwe Gas Movement, Activists Outraged At Lenient Sentencing Of
Daewoo International Executives for Arms Export to Burma,
http://www.earthrights.org/burmafeature/activists._outraged-atjlenient-sentencing-of-dae
woo_executives_forarmsexport_to.burma.html (last visited June 6, 2008).
140. See Daniel Yergin, Ensuring Energy Security, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 69; See
also Sebastian Mallaby, What 'Energy Security' Really Means, WASH. POST, July 3, 2006, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/ 2006/07/02/ AR2006070200675.html.
141. Yergin, supra note 140, at 69.
142. The Burmese junta, for example, is criticized for giving preferential treatment to
Chinese multinationals that are bidding for its natural resource in exchange for protection at
the U.N. level. On January 12, 2007 China vetoed a United Nations Security Council
resolution that would have resulted in UNSC-supported action in Burma. On 15 January 2007,
three days after the veto, China was awarded lucrative exploration contracts by MOGE. CNPC
to Explore Oil, Gas In Three Myanmar Offshore Areas, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 15, 2007.
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revenue. 143  Despite these differences in interpretation, the common
denominator is universally inadequate attention of states and corporations
to the human rights impacts of resource extraction in their energy
planning.
This Part briefly explores the regional and international energy security
dynamic converging on Burma as it pertains to natural gas exploration and
production and human rights. A complete treatment of the history and
roles of the most relevant actors in this particular resource equation -
governments and corporations from India, China, South Korea, Thailand,
the United States, and France - is beyond this paper, but we do touch on a
few key issues regarding the energy security dynamic that is unfolding in
Burma.
A. A Concept is Born
Energy security as we know it today is a widely applied concept but it
is actually a term born in Burma under the British flag. The concept is
widely attributed to Winston Churchill in 1912, just prior to World War I,
when he decided to transition from coal to oil to give British combat ships
an advantage over the slower, coal-powered ships of adversaries.'" This
required securing the delivery of oil, which was not part of Britain's
natural heritage. But the concept took shape at least a few years prior to
this. In the early twentieth century, Burma was still under British colonial
rule, and its oil fields were the British Empire's only major source of crude
oil, a source they sought to strategically monopolize. 145 These assets were
largely controlled by the Burmah Oil Company Limited, a private British
company which in 1886 took over the assets of the Rangoon Oil Company,
modernized Burma's oil production, and later went on to become the
multinational corporation known today as Castrol. 146
In 1905, years before Churchill's historic military decision, the British
Admirality and the Burmah Oil Company signed in Burma what was
arguably the first contract motivated by energy security interests, as we
understand the phrase today. Up until that point, Burmah Oil had been
143. PAUL COLLIER, THE BoTroM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2007); Radon, supra note 27; Joseph E. Stiglitz, What is the Role of
the State?, in ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 23, 24 (Macartan Humphreys et al. eds., 2007).
144. GEOFFREY JONES, THE STATE AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE BRITISH OIL INDUSTRY 9-31
(1981); MICHAEL KLARE, RESOURCE WARS: THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL CONFLICT 30
(2001); DANEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY & POWER 155 (1993).
145. MARILYN V. LONGMUIR, OIL IN BURMA: THE EXTRACTION OF "EARTH OIL" TO 1914, at
200, 203-209, 211, 215, 216, 267 (2001) [hereinafter EARTH OIL].
146. Castrol is the world's preeminent supplier of automobile and motorcycle lubricants,
including transmission and brake fluids, as well as engine oil. Society of Petroleum Engineers
Int'l, The Coloured History of the Burmah Oil Company, 19 MYAN. TIMES, Aug. 20-26, 2007,
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selling kerosene exclusively to India,' 47 also a British colony. The 1905
contract stipulated that India reject any further oil concessions to foreign
companies or even to British companies with foreign shareholders, a move
which "protected the fields from unwarranted intrusion, but also reduced
[the] pressure of competition on Burmah Oil."' 48 In the stroke of a colonial
pen, Burma was positioned squarely at the origins of what would become
one of today's most pregnant and political catchphrases: energy security.
B. Burma's Growing Natural Gas Sector
Today, over 100 years later, the people of Burma enjoy neither energy
nor security. Despite this fact, Burma has the fastest growing oil and gas
industry in Southeast Asia, with at least twenty-seven companies from
thirteen countries invested,149 and several other new investments being
actively pursued. Overall foreign investment in fiscal year 2006-07 was
U.S. $ 752.3 million, according to official statistics, and foreign investment
in oil and gas was U.S. $ 471.5 million, up from just U.S. $ 35 million the
previous year. 50 This noteworthy jump in foreign investment was coupled
with the largest yet revenues from natural gas sales: approximately U.S. $
2.16 billion in exports to Thailand in 2006, which was up by 50 percent
from the previous year.'51 In the 2007 fiscal year overall exports rose to
U.S. $ 5.9 billion, with natural gas exports amounting to U.S. $ 2.7 billion.
Imports were at U.S. $ 2.8 billion, making a trade surplus of U.S. $ 3.1
billion for the same period1s2 This unprecedented activity in Burma
occurred simultaneously with one of the country's worst years for human
rights in almost sixty years of military rule.
According to Rick Herz, "Corporations ... may prefer the stability of
147. Many of today's multinational oil companies were started in the early nineteenth
century to provide kerosene to urban markets in North America and Europe. This includes
today's Exxon-Mobil and Royal Dutch/Shell. KLARE, supra note 144, at 30.
148. EARTH OIL, supra note 145, at 267. On the eve of World War One, Churchill was
quoted as saying, "[s]afety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone." Yergin, supra
note 140, at 69. This was perhaps the earliest public articulation of the energy security
strategy of diversifying sources of natural resources, which is currently being employed most
notably by China and India.
149. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Burma: Targeted Sanctions Needed on
Petroleum Industry (Nov. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2007/11/16/burma17356.htm.
150. Myanmar Gas Industry Attracts Record Investments - Official Data, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESS, Nov 29, 2007. See also Central Statistical Org. of Myan., Ministry of Nat'l Planning &
Econ Dev., http://www.csostat.gov.mm/s06MA0206.asp (last visisted June 6, 2008).
According to U Zaw Win Maung, "The Central Statistical Organization is the only
authoritative organization in Myanmar that has the mandate to collect, process, organize and
supply data for the use of planners, policy-makers and other users in the country as well as
international bodies." U Zaw Win Maung, ASEAN Statistical Classification Workshop,
presentation in Hanoi, Vietnam (June 10-14, 2002).
151. Ye Lwin & Kyaw Thu, Government Dominates Foreign Trade as Gas Sales Pump Up
Exports, MYAN. TIMES, June 4-10, 2007; See also Central Statistical Org. of Myanmar, supra note
125.
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their existing partnership with autocratic regimes over the uncertainty of
democratization." 153 Herz argues that companies may have a reluctant or
empty commitment to promote democracy and human rights when their
interests are better served by autocracy. In other words, when the
fundamental interest of multinational corporations is to maximize profit
and ensure the stability of their investment, the reality is that those
interests may be better served by a perverse status quo; that is, by the
violation of human rights rather than the protection and promotion of
human rights.
In Burma, repressive social engineering has been the chosen pastime of
a string of military juntas since 1962. Aside from the threat of lethal force,
there are laws against organizing in groups larger than five.154 This climate
is favorable to foreign investment by oil companies in that it effectively
curtails against any democratic dissent that may derail, postpone, or
otherwise complicate an oil and gas project, and it eliminates the costs
associated with the equitable treatment of local people. These
characteristics are objectively economical according to the interests of a
multinational corporation, and they undoubtedly factor into a company's
political risk assessment. They are also wholly inconsistent with the
protection of human rights.
While the stability generated by this climate of repression may help to
explain why oil companies may prefer military-ruled Burma to any
democratic alternative in the country, it does not account for the rapid
growth in the oil and gas sector in recent years. Instead, we attribute the
growing foreign investment in Burma's oil and gas to at least five sources,
each described in greater detail below. They are: Burma's plentiful
resources; increasing demand for resources in Asia, specifically by Burma's
immediate neighbors India, China, and Thailand; increased commercial
interest in natural gas; the evolution of the oil industry beyond traditional
western oil dominance; and a large gas discovery in Burma's Bay of Bengal
by South Korea's Daewoo International in late 2003. The purpose in laying
out these characteristics of the energy security dynamic in Burma is to
demonstrate the general lack of attention to human rights.
As in the colonial days of the Burmah Oil Company, there are still
thousands of traditional oil workers in Burma and multinationals are
currently moving in to exploit this resource, but now nearly all of the
foreign investment in Burma is in natural gas, Burma's core asset. The
country has three main offshore oil and gas fields, and nineteen onshore,
with a proved natural gas reserve of 19 tcf.155 These plentiful resources are
153. Herz, supra note 37.
154. Article 141 prohibits unlawful assembly. Section #141, Chapter VIII, Myanmar Penal
Code, available at http://www.blc-burma.org/html/Myanmar%20Penal%20Code/mpc.html.
Regarding the invocation of Article 141 by the SPDC during the 2007 protests, see also HUM.
RTS. WATCH, BULLETS IN THE ALMS BOWL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE BRUTAL SPDC SUPPRESSION OF
THE SEPTEMBER 2007 SAFFRON REVOLUTION 56 (2008); HuM. RTS. WATCH, CRACKDOWN:
REPRESSION OF THE 2007 POPULAR PROTESTS IN BURMA 68, 67 n.97 (2007).
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a major source of the growing foreign direct investment in Burma.
Second, production and consumption in Asia are on an unprecedented
rise. The emerging Asian economies are expanding and will require more
natural resources. For the period from 2004-2030, the highest projected
demand for energy is from non-OECD countries,156 and during this period,
production increases in non-OECD countries will account for more than
ninety percent of the world's total growth in natural gas production.15 7 Of
non-OECD countries, the highest projected demand comes from non-
OECD Asia, which includes China and India and currently comprises fifty-
three percent of the world's population. Likewise, sixty percent of the
increase in energy use among non-OECD countries will come from non-
OECD Asia. 158 According to the economist Jeffrey Sachs, "Asia's fate is
truly the world's fate."1 59
With the exception of South Korea and Japan, the world's top two
importers of liquefied natural gas (LNG), most of Asia will handle natural
gas through pipelines, the most economical form of transport. The Oil &
Gas Journal reported that 10,000 miles of pipelines were planned to be laid
on our planet in 2007, 75% for natural gas. Of all the world's regions, Asia
led in new natural gas pipelines in 2007, constructing nearly 3,000 miles.1 60
China currently has approximately 25,000 miles of oil and gas pipelines,
and is poised to increase that by 6,200 miles before 2010 to support
economic development, according to state-run media sources. 161
Beyond the increasing demand and production, a third factor in
Burma's fast-growing natural gas sector is that natural gas is increasingly
regarded as a commercially and environmentally viable alternative to oil.
As more governments and corporations plan to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions, they will increasingly turn to natural gas, and the world's
industrial sector already accounts for nearly half of the world's natural gas
ubl ications/statistical-energy-review-2007/STAGING/local-assets/downloads/pdf/ natural
-gas-section_2007.pdf. See also Siddharth Srivastava, India Cuts to the Chase with Myanmar,
ASIATIMES, Oct. 5, 2007, available at http://www. atimes.com/Southasia/IJ05Df02.html.
156. The OECD is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, an
international organization with thirty member governments "committed to democracy and
the market economy." The mission of the OECD is to "assist sound economic expansion in
other countries and to contribute to growth in world trade on a multilateral, non-
discriminatory basis." OECD, History,
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761863-1_1_1_1l,00.html (last visited
Mar. 26, 2008).
157. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., OFFICE OF INTEGRATED ANALYSIS AND FORECASTING, U.S. Dept.
of Energy, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 39 (2007) , available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html.
158. Id. at 6.
159. JEFFREY SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME 142
(2006).
160. C.E. Smith, 2007 Construction Lags 2006, But More Projects Lie Ahead, OIL & GAS J., Feb.
19, 2007, at 48.
161. Xinhua News Agency, China to add 25,000 kin ofoil and gas pipelines by 2010, PEOPLE'S
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use.162 Moreover, the unprecedented rising price of oil will lead consumers
in the industrial and power sectors to substitute natural gas, ushering in
more commercial interest in natural gas.163
Globally, the corporate make-up of the oil and gas industry is changing
in non-trivial ways, and this is the fourth reason we identify for the rapid
growth in Burma's oil and gas sector. For much of the twentieth century,
the oil industry was controlled by what the Italian politician Enrico Mattei
famously referred to as the "seven sisters," the seven western
multinationals that dominated the industry throughout the twentieth
century.1M After various mergers, only four sisters remain: ExxonMobil,
Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron, and BP. These companies are now grouped
alongside Total S.A. and ConocoPhillips and referred to collectively as the
"supermajors." While the supermajors still enjoy far-reaching economic
power and influence, they are in this regard comparatively less super than
they used to be. In recent years, a multitude of national oil companies
(NOCs) have appeared on the international scene, cooperating abroad to
develop resources beyond their borders; they are not necessarily
prioritizing the protection of human rights. These NOCs operate
commercially like "big oil" but with political backing from their home
governments that private corporations may lack. Approximately seventy-
seven percent of the world's oil reserves are now held by national oil
companies with no private equity. 65 In its own assessment, the Financial
Times has recently named "The New Seven Sisters." 166 These "sisters" are
non-OECD rivals of traditional "Big Oil"; and they are increasingly
powerful national oil companies that are overwhelmingly state-owned:
Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabia), JSC Gazprom (Russia), CNPC (China),
NIOC (Iran), PDVSA (Venezuela), Petrobras (Brazil), and Petronas
(Malaysia). Of the twenty-seven foreign companies involved in oil and gas
exploration and production in Burma, at least ten are wholly or partially
owned by national governments, including companies from China, India,
Korea, Thailand, Japan, and Malaysia.
Finally, a more obvious reason for Burma's growing oil and gas
industry was simply Daewoo International's discovery of the Shwe deposits
in late 2003. It was in part Daewoo's prospect for commercial success in
Burma that evidently provided other oil companies the necessary
confidence they needed to invest in Burma. According to Uu Zaw Minn,
general manager of Oil Service Company Ltd., a Burmese company, after
Daewoo's discovery "other oil and gas companies began to think that there
162. According to the International Energy Organization, the industrial sector accounted
for 44 percent of world natural gas consumption in 2004 and is projected to account for 43
percent in 2030. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 157.
163. Jit Yang Lim, Decoupling of Oil and Gas Prices?, ENERGY TRIB., Dec. 2007, at 25-27,
available at http://www.energytribune.com/articles.cfm?aid=730.
164. Carola Hoyos, The New Seven Sisters, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/471aelb8-dOO1-lldb-94cb-OOOb5dflO621.html.
165. Tina Rosenberg, The Perils of Petrocracy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/04/ magazine/O4oil-t.html.
166. Hoyos, supra note 164.
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might be more in the region, so they started coming to Myanmar [Burma]
to explore." 167
While these reasons explain part of the increased corporate activity in
Burma's oil and gas sector, they do not take into account the policies of the
governments involved, especially the Burmese regime and the host
governments of the NOCs. Predicated on energy security, these policies
have also contributed to the increased interest in Burma's oil and gas, at the
expense of human rights.
C. The Junta, The Peaceful Rise, Neighbor Engagement, and the Look
East Policy
The most significant energy policy in terms of its potential to affect
poor human rights outcomes in Burma is the policy of the junta itself,
which is quickly expanding exploration and production of oil and gas
while concurrently extending its repressive rule. The regime's energy
policy cannot really be understood in terms of energy security in the sense
of ensuring that Burma itself has a sufficient supply of energy resources;
instead, the junta's actions are almost entirely focused on ensuring that the
junta has a sufficient supply of cash to keep it in power despite being
widely unpopular. 168
Human rights abuses are a necessary part of this strategy. Residents of
Arakan State in western Burma, for example, the location of Burma's vast
natural gas deposits, are largely unaware of corporate and state plans to
extract the resources in their State,169 and they also enjoy little to no access
to electricity. Over ninety percent of the people in Arakan and Chin States
use candles for light and firewood as their primary source of cooking
fuel,170 and Arakan State, Tenasserim Division, and Chin State have the
lowest energy consumption of all of Burma's states/divisions, in terms of
megawatts per person.171
All of this occurs in the context of extreme vanity spending by the
military, as the regime made unconscionable expenditures on constructing
an entirely new and modern capital city from the ground up in Naypidaw,
167. Kaw Thu, Daewoo's Massive Gas Strike Puts Rakhine Region in Spotlight, 19 MYAN.
TIMES, Aug. 20-26, 2007, available at http://www.mmtimes.com/feature/energy/017.htm.
168. The Yadana natural gas project began to provide revenue for the junta at a time when
it was upon financial collapse. EARTHRIGHTS INT'L, THE HUMAN COST OF ENERGY 21 (2008),
available at http://www.earthrights.org/files/Burma%20Project/Yadana/HCoE-pages.pdf.
Prior to the Yadana project, one reporter noted that the junta "was short of cash," and its
foreign exchange reserves "shrank to less than the foreign-currency deposits they are
supposed to cover." Bertil Lintner, Paper Tiger, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 7, 1997.
169. SUPPLY AND COMMAND, supra note 109, at 41.
170. The lack of electricity in Arakan State is of course easily observable to the naked eye.
According one local, "There is no electricity in our village-only the richest man has a
generator that he used for his TV. We use paraffin light-candles are too expensive. We use
firewood for cooking. Our family used to make charcoal, but the government said that the
forest is owned by the government and if we make charcoal too many trees will be cut, so now
we don't use charcoal. Rich people still use it though." SUPPLY AND COMMAND, supra note
109, at 18, 41.
171. SUPPLY AND COMMAND, supra note 109, at 19.
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which in Burmese means "seat of kings." It is also occurring in the context
of the national biofuel program mentioned above, which is predicated on
the forced planting of jatropha.
D. China's Peaceful Rise and Human Rights in Burma
The second most influential energy policy in terms of human rights in
Burma is arguably China's heping jueqi, or "Peaceful Rise." The term was
first used by Zheng Bijian, a senior advisor to the Chinese leadership, and
it quickly caught on with officials and scholars, although some in China
have opted instead for the term "Peaceful Development," as "rise" was
thought by some to sound menacing. 172 The central idea of the peaceful
rise is that China's development will not pose a threat to any other country,
but instead will be mutually beneficial and sustainable. According to
Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, this development "will not come at the cost of
any other country, will not stand in the way of any other country, nor pose
a threat to any other country." 173
China's strict policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other
countries is related to its energy security policy, which is widely criticized
as incoherent. China's "conditions-free" lending, military and political
support, and investments in oil and gas in rogue states such as Burma is
often interpreted as direct involvement in the internal affairs of these
countries, to the detriment of human rights. China's political support of
the regime in Burma, for example, was indicated by its recent veto of a
United Nations Security Council resolution that would have resulted in
UNSC-supported action in Burma prior to the country's brutal crackdown
on monks and pro-democracy activists. 174 On January 15, 2007, three days
after the veto, China was awarded lucrative exploration contracts by the
state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) in Burma.175
In June 2005, China convened a high level interagency group called the
Energy Leading Group, led by Premier Wen Jiabao and tasked with,
among other things, monitoring the status of energy security and
determining policy.176 The group's agenda includes "[elnergy strategy and
major policies, the development and conservation of energy resources,
energy security and emergency responses as well as energy cooperation
with foreign parties.." 177 Since 2005, the government has also been busy
172. JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, CHARM OFFENSIVE: How CHINA'S SOFT POWER IS
TRANSFORMING THE WORLD 37-38 (2007).
173. Id. at 38.
174. Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma, Economy, BURMA BULLETIN, Jan. 2007, at 1-2,
available at http://www.altsean.org.
175. Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma, Key story, BURMA BULLETIN, Jan. 2007, at 7,
available at http://www.altsean.org; Xinhua News Agency, Chinese Company to explore oil, gas
in three Myanmar offshore areas, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Jan. 16, 2007, available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200701/16/eng20070116_341436.html.
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drafting laws pertaining to energy security, including principles of energy
saving, cleaner and more efficient use of energy, mostly relevant to
domestic energy use and security.178
In a government white paper entitled "China's Energy Conditions and
Policies," China recognized that "[elnergy security is a global issue," and
recommended three areas for international community focus:
strengthening dialogue between energy consuming states and energy
producing states; popularizing energy conservation technology and
improve energy efficiency; and maintaining stability in energy producing
states.' 79  Regarding the latter, the white paper maintains that
"safeguarding world peace and regional stability is the prerequisite for
global energy security." 180 The paper fails to mention the role of corporate
accountability in safeguarding peace and stability, but instead goes on to
issue a pregnant warning: "energy issues should not be politicized."' 81
China is currently one of the Burmese junta's closest allies, providing
financial support in the form of conditions-free loans,182 political support, 183
and military armaments,184 while also investing heavily in Burma's natural
resources. 185 EarthRights International researchers recently found more
than twenty-six Chinese multinational corporations (MNCs) involved in
more than sixty-two hydropower, oil, gas, and mining projects in Burma.186
Chinese multinationals are currently involved in at least seventeen onshore
and offshore oil and gas projects in Burma, with investment from at least
seven companies, including the three major Chinese oil and gas companies
Sinopec, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), and China
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). In 2006 and again in 2007,
the wholly state-owned CNPC and its eighty-eight percent-owned
subsidiary PetroChina signed MOUs with MOGE for five offshore blocks
off the coast of Arakan State in western Burma. 87
178. New Law to Strengthen Energy Security, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 22, 2005, available at
http://english.gov.cn/2005-10/22/content_81506.htm.
179. INFO. OFFICE, STATE COUNCIL, PEOPLE'S REP. OF CHINA, Strengthening International




182. China to Provide Myanmar With US$200 Loan, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 11, 2006,
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/11/content_613786.htm.
183. United Nations News Service, China and Russia Veto US/UK-backed Security Council
Draft Resolution on Myanmar, Jan. 12, 2007, available at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=21228&Cr=myanmar&Cr1.
184. AMNESTY INT'L, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: SUSTAINING CONFLICT AND HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES (2006), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa170302006.
185. See EARTHRIGHTS INT'L, CHINA IN BURMA 1 (2007), available at
http://www.earthrights.org/files/Reports/BACKGROUNDER%20China%20in%20Burma.p
df.
186. Id. at 1. These figures, restricted to investment of Chinese multinationals, exclude the
timber industry and the many small-scale Chinese mining companies currently mining for
gold, jade, and precious gems in Burma.
187. Id. at 3.
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In August 2007, reports emerged that the Burmese military confirmed
the sale to PetroChina of natural gas from the Shwe gas project, which will
also run parallel to a proposed oil pipeline.18  In November 2007,
PetroChina's parent company CNPC signed an agreement with provincial
authorities in Yunnan to construct an oil refining base.189 This deal is part
of a larger development plan that involves the construction of an oil
pipeline to run through Burma to Kunming, parallel to the aforementioned
gas pipeline. This proposed oil pipeline is intended to provide an
alternative to shipping through the narrow Strait of Malacca, which is
currently the main link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. For China,
the pipeline means a cheaper and more secure way to deliver oil from the
Middle East, South America, and Africa, and it means delivering oil to the
landlocked Yunnan Province. Like the gas pipeline, it also means
constructing a pipeline that will traverse at least twenty-four townships in
military-ruled Burma, crossing the entire width of the country from the far
west to the northeast border with China.
E. Thailand's "Neighbor Engagement" and Human Rights in Burma
China's "peaceful rise" will unarguably leave the largest footprint on
Burma in the future, but Thailand has had a comparable effect over the last
twenty years, before and after former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra
developed in 2001 the policy of "forward engagement." According to Dr.
Surakiart Sathirathai, former Foreign Minister under Thaksin's
government:
Thailand's forward engagement foreign policy is graduating
Thailand from a recipient country into a donor country status.
This forward engagement foreign policy advocates the principle of
self-help and partnership. It aims at turning international diversity
and differences into a force for strength and harmony. It believes in
creating regional partnership for global multilateralism. 190
Contrary to assumptions that India and China are Burma's largest
economic partners, Thailand is actually Burma's largest trading partner,
ranking as the country's leading destination of exports in 2005 (at 45% of
all exports), followed by India (11.9%) and China (6.8%); and ranking
second in terms of origins of imports (21.5%) just behind China (28.4%). 191
188. Myanmar Selects PetroChina for Gas Sale, REUTERS, Aug. 14, 2007.
189. CNPC to Build Refineries in Shandong and Yunnan, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 25, 2007.
190. Dr. Surakiart Sathirathai, Thai Foreign Minister, Speech at Asia Society, Thailand:
The Path Forward (Sept. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/sathirathai04ny.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008).
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Thailand derives most of its electricity from natural gas. In terms of oil
and gas in Burma, Thailand's policy has been consistent with China's:
explore, produce, and purchase. In 2006, the junta collected U.S. $ 2.16
billion in sales of natural gas to Thailand, which represents a fifty percent
increase from the previous year, due to the rising cost of gas and oil but not
an increase in exports.192 This includes gas transported through the Yadana
pipeline. In 2007, PTTEP-a wholly owned subsidiary of the state-
controlled company PTT193-put in bids for new natural gas projects in
Burma, including the Shwe project in the Bay of Bengal 194 and the country is
continuing to explore for commercially viable natural gas deposits in
Burma's Gulf of Martaban.195
Thai-Burma relations appeared to be in peril after the September 19,
2006 military coup deposing then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.
Under the Thai junta, the acting Energy Minister Piyasvati Amranand
announced that Thailand would no longer rely on Burma for gas supplies
or electricity from dam schemes in the next decade. 196 Amranand stated
that beyond 2011, gas would be bought elsewhere. 97 Not long after this,
however, PTTEP announced its plans to invest U.S. $ 1 billion to develop
new gas deposits in the Gulf of Martaban.198 More recently, Thailand's new
Foreign Minister Noppadan Pattama under the recently elected
government claimed that Thailand would prioritize national economic
interests over human rights in Burma out of economic necessity.199 "In the
past, we had constructive engagement and flexible engagement, but they
never took us anywhere. Now we will adopt another approach, neighbor
engagement." 2°° This puts to rest any speculation that Thailand will adopt
a policy of disengagement with the Burmese junta based on respect for the
human rights.
F. India's "Look East Policy" and Human Rights in Burma
India's "Look East Policy" is an economic strategy developed under
the administration of Narasimha Rao in the 1990s that prioritizes
expanding and strengthening India's economic and political relationship
with its neighbors in the Association of South East Asian Nations
192. Lwin & Thu, supra note 151.
193. PTT is two-thirds owned by Thailand's Ministry of Finance, with 52.32 percent
owned by the ministry, and 15.54 percent owned by the ministry's investment fund.
194. William Boot, Burma to Lose Out in Thai Energy Industry Shake-Up, IRRAWADDY, Nov.
10, 2006, available at http://www.shwe.org/docs/burma-to-lose-out-in-thai-energy-industry-
shake-up.
195. Matthew Smith, First as Tragedy, Second as Farce, BANGKOK POST, May 22, 2007.
196. Boot, supra note 194.
197. Id.
198. Thailand's P7TEP to Invest I Billion Dollars in Myanmar Gas Project, AFX, Nov. 13, 2007,
available at http://www.forbes.com/markets/ feeds/afx/2007/11/13/afx4331512.html.
199. Achara Ashayagachat, New Approach to Burma, Says Noppadon, BANGKOK POST, Feb.
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(ASEAN), including Burma.2 1 According to Professor Sanjib Baruah, "[aill
subsequent governments have supported the policy and have built on
it."202 The most noteworthy feature of the Look East Policy in regards to
Burma is that it marked a break from India's previous support for Burma's
pro-democracy movement, instead opting to engage the junta on several
fronts, including an increase in investments in oil and gas, financing
hydropower projects, and increasing trade relations and the sale of military
weapons. Analysts note that India's shift in policy towards Burma is in
part to gain strategic geopolitical influence where China clearly had the
upper hand. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in 2008
referred to India's relationship with the junta as "close and friendly." 20 3
India's economic and political relationship with the generals is also
closely linked to joint-counter insurgency efforts along the Indo-Burma
border, where several armed groups from India's Northeast States take
refuge in their ongoing struggle for rights and political recognition against
India's central government. India's Chief of Army Staff, General Deepak
Kapoor has claimed that India has good relations with the junta and that it
"should maintain these" to ensure the success of counter-insurgency efforts
in the Northeast.2°4
Despite this, India's strategy probably has much less to do with
counter-insurgency operations than with strengthening economic ties and
extracting natural resources. In September 2007, while hundreds of
thousands of protestors marched the streets of cities across Burma after the
junta raised the price of fuels -demanding a decrease in prices, the release
of political prisoners, and a transition to democracy-India's Petroleum
Minister Murli Deora traveled to Burma with executives of ONGC Videsh
and signed a new PSC for natural gas exploration and production of 3
deep-water exploration blocks in Burma's Bay of Bengal. 2 5 More. recently,
India's Essar Oil, a privately owned firm, began test drilling an onshore
natural gas block in Sittwe, which was originally agreed upon in PSCs
signed in 2005.206
The government of India is also in the process of connecting Northeast
India with sea routes via the Kaladan River through Burma, which flows to
the Bay of Bengal through Mizoram State in India and Chin and Arakan
201. ASEAN member countries are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Burma, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
202. SANJIB BARUAH, DURABLE DISORDER: UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICS OF NORTHEAST
INDIA 222 (2005).
203. Ministry of External Affairs, Briefing By Official Spokesperson On Visit of Foreign
Minister of Myanmar (Jan. 2, 2008), available at http://mea.gov.in/cgi-
bin/ db2www/ meaxpsite/coverpage.d2w/coverpg?sec=pb&filename=pressbriefing/ 2008/01
/02pb02.htm.
204. Praful Bidwai, Failing the Foreign Policy Test, FRONTLINE, Oct. 6-19, 2007, available at
http://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/fline/fl2420/stories/20071019509111400.htm.
205. See Murli Deora Witnesses Signing, supra note 127; see also Myantnar Activists Protest
Murli Deora's Visit, supra note 127.
206. Bi Mingxin, Indian Company to Explore Gas in Myanmar Inland Block, CHINA VIEW, Feb.
20, 2008, available at http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-02/20/content-7637820.htm.
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States in Burma. Dubbed the Kaladan Project, the India government has
agreed to invest U.S. $ 120 million to develop the Arakan capital of Sittwe
as an economic center, enabling seafaring cargo ships direct access to the
otherwise landlocked Northeast States. It will also include the
development of a road that will connect Kalewa in Chin State to India's
national highway system in Mizoram.2 7 Conceived by the Indian Foreign
Ministry in 2003, the potential human rights impacts of the Kaladan Project
or the new oil and gas exploration have not been discussed publicly,
despite both projects posing serious threats to the human rights of local
residents.
VI. CONCLUSION
Oil and gas production in Burma is plagued by serious human rights
abuses. The governments and corporations involved in the extraction of
Burma's resources continue to pay a dangerously inadequate amount of
attention to human rights in Burma. Human rights abuses connected to the
Yadana gas project began around 1991, and these abuses are continuing
today with the complicity of Chevron, Total, and PTrEP. Information
collected by ERI between 2003-2008 indicates that not only are human
rights abuses continuing in connection to the project, but that the
companies are aware of the abuses, and their socio-economic program,
which they promote as a beacon of corporate responsibility, is in fact
grossly inadequate relative to the companies' claims.
The Daewoo-led Shwe gas project, like Yadana before it, stands to have
the same human rights impacts as Yadana but on a larger scale. Daewoo
International, KOGAS, ONGC Videsh, and GAIL are demonstrating a
dangerous disregard for the potential human rights impact of the project.
Likewise, the energy security strategies of the governments of China,
Thailand, and India very clearly prioritize economic development, while
ignoring human rights abroad. Each country has outlined broad strategies
of what they refer to as energy security, resulting in a narrow type of
engagement with the Burmese regime that fails to promote, protect, and
defend human rights, despite the serious human rights impacts of natural
resource extraction in Burma. This basic and avoidable failure at the
highest levels of government sets the stage for corporate-level complicity in
human rights abuses on the ground. These concerns apply likewise to
alternative energy security strategies, as serious and massive human rights
impacts also accompany alternative sources of energy, such as the
construction of hydropower dams2°8 and the cultivation of biofuels.
207. Indo-Burma Agreement Expected on Kaladan Project, NARINJARA NEWS, Jan. 11, 2008,
available at http://www.indoburmanews.net/archives-1/2008/january-2008/indo-burma-
agreement-expected-on-kaladan-project.
208. For human rights impacts of hydropower dams in Burma, see The Salween Watch
Coalition Homepage, http://www.salweenwatch.org (last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
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In light of these concerns, all governments should enact and strengthen
legal and regulatory mechanisms that allow for corporate liability and
accountability for complicity in abuses abroad, and enable access to justice
for survivors of abuses abroad. Our globalized, energy-hungry world
merits nothing less. Civil society organizations and citizens should
advocate for legislation in their home countries to create such mechanisms,
in the name of human rights and energy security.
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